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ABSTRACT 
 
It is well known that higher education financing involves uncertainty and risk 
with respect to students’ future economic fortunes, and an unwillingness of banks to 
provide loans because of the absence of collateral.  It follows that without government 
intervention there will be both socially sub-optimal and regressive outcomes with respect 
to the provision of higher education. The historically most common response to this 
market failure — a government guarantee to repay student loans to banks in the event of 
default — is associated with significant problems.  
Income contingent loans offer a possible solution. Since the late 1980s ICLs have 
been adopted in, or recommended for, a significant and growing number of countries, and 
it is this important international policy reform that has motivated the Chapter. 
An ICL provides students with finance for tuition and/or income support, its 
critical and defining characteristic being that the collection of the debt depends on the 
borrowers’ future capacity to pay. ICL have two major insurance advantages for 
borrowers over more typical arrangements: default protection and consumption 
smoothing. 
With reference to countries with both successful and unsuccessful ICL, the paper 
illustrates that the operational and design features of such schemes are of fundamental 
importance with respect to their potential efficacy. It also seems to be the case that in 
many institutional and political environments there is not yet the administrative 
sophistication to make ICLs viable, although for reasons documented this is unlikely to 
be the case for the vast majority of OECD countries. 
For one country, Australia, there is now a significant amount of research into the 
consequences of an ICL, and the evidence is explored in some detail. The investigation 
into the Australian experience helps in the development of a research agenda.  
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1. Introduction
What follows is an examination and analysis of what is, by historical policy 
standards, a new phenomenon in the financing of higher education: income contingent 
loans. The broad concept of income contingent loans (ICL) can be traced to the 
pioneering work of Friedman (1955), in which a particular form of the instrument, a 
graduate tax, was promoted as a possible response to the capital market problem 
associated with higher education financing.  But it was not until the 1980s that 
arrangements of this form began to be adopted.  
An ICL for higher education funding takes the following form. Borrowers, 
students, are provided with finance for tuition and/or income support, usually with the 
resources being provided by the public sector, although there is no reason why funding 
could not come from commercial banks. The critical and defining characteristic of an ICL 
is that the collection of the debt depends on the borrowers’ future levels of income. 
Capacity to pay, and not time, defines the repayment obligation. 
Yale University offered a particular type of ICL in the 1970s, but in national 
terms it happened first in a very blunt way in Sweden, with respect to a limited form of 
student income support in the early 1980s. This was followed by the adoption in 
Australia in 1989 of a national income contingent charging mechanism where, for the 
first time, repayments were collected through the tax system. New Zealand implemented 
an ICL in 1992 with a similar, although more market oriented, scheme which covered 
living costs as well as tuition. 
An unusual form of an ICL was put in place in the US in 1993, but its take-up has 
been very low, for reasons explained below. The concept was also introduced in Chile in 
1994, with the conversion of its existing conventional bank loan scheme to an income 
contingent form. South Africa followed in 1996 with arrangements designed mainly for 
tuition, as was the case in Australia, but with a small proportion of students being 
allowed additional funds for living expenses.  
The UK government instituted an ICL for the recovery of student loans in 1997, 
and this was a complicated version of the original Australian system for tuition. This has 
been changed it in 2005 to more closely resemble the form of the New Zealand initiative. 
Ethiopia changed its higher education financing arrangements with an unusual variant of 
ICL in 2003, and Thailand is on track to introduce a close variant of the Australian 
system in late 2005. 
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It is clear that over the last decade or so governments, researchers and policy 
makers of many countries have been engaged in public debate concerning the potential of 
ICL to replace existing higher education financing arrangements. They include Canada, 
Hungary and a host of developing countries, with a significant number in the last group 
exploring ways in which an ICL scheme for higher education could be implemented. 
With the encouragement of the World Bank and other international aid agencies, these 
ideas became a major part of active debate for developing countries in the late 1990s and 
early to mid-2000s, including in: Indonesia, Namibia, Nepal, Mexico, Rwanda and the 
Republic of South Korea.1 As well, in March 2003 the World Bank sent a mission to the 
Philippines to explore tertiary education financing, including the viability of ICL. 
Further, international aid agencies and national governments are (at least in informal 
ways) in the process of examining possible similar avenues for higher education 
financing reform in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Germany and Colombia.  
This paper is an attempt to describe and explain the background to, and provide 
the analytical basis of, these policy debates and international reforms. It begins with an 
exploration of the case for both public sector university charges for students and taxpayer 
subsidies. A critical issue relates to the role of government beyond just the provision of a 
subsidy, which can be traced to market failure in the provision of private sector finance 
for higher education.  
The essential issues for policy can be understood to be the result of uncertainty 
and risk with respect to students’ future economic fortunes, and the understandable lack 
of willingness of banks to provide loans in the absence of collateral in the event of former 
students’ defaulting. It is clear that without government intervention of some kind there 
will be both socially sub-optimal and regressive outcomes with respect to the provision 
and outcomes of higher education. 
A key point in the discussion is that the historically most common response to this 
market failure — a government guarantee to repay student loans to banks in the event of 
default — is associated with significant problems. Alternative approaches to the problem, 
such as the provision of means-tested scholarships to individuals from poor backgrounds, 
are also flawed for several reasons, and these are explained. Something different is 
needed as a response to the traditional policy mechanisms. 
                                                 
1 In at least Ethiopia and Rwanda there have been active steps towards this type of policy initiative but it 
seems to be the case that in many countries implementation and administrative challenges are considerable, 
and this issue is examined in detail in Section 5. 
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The conceptual basis of income contingent loans as an alternative approach to 
higher education is explained in detail. ICL have two major advantages over more typical 
borrowing arrangements involving bank loans with government guarantees. Both benefits 
involve the provision of insurance, and can be traced to the fact that ICL repayments are 
defined by the borrower’s capacity to repay debt. 
The first insurance benefit of ICL concerns default. That is, because repayments 
are not required in periods of low income, borrowers are never in a financial situation in 
which they are unable to meet their loan repayment obligation. This will not be the case 
with respect to normal bank loans. 
The second insurance benefit of ICL for borrowers is that they can eliminate 
expected future hardships associated with repayment. Compared to bank loans ICL 
provide consumption smoothing, which is again the result of repayments being 
determined by capacity to pay. When incomes are low ICL payments are not required, the 
tradeoff being that when incomes are high repayment obligations are greater. 
It is argued that so long as they are designed sensibly, and can be made 
operationally efficient, ICL schemes have significant potential as a solution to higher 
education financing challenges. The paper illustrates that the operational and design 
features of such schemes are of fundamental importance with respect to the potential 
efficacy of funding reforms. 
There are many forms of income contingent financing instruments, and in what 
follows the different variants are compared and contrasted with respect to a host of 
economic issues, such as adverse selection, moral hazard, allocative efficiency, equity 
and administrative feasibility. It seems to be the case that a particular form of ICL, using 
the public sector as the insurer (a ‘risk-sharing’ ICL), has more attractive properties than 
other types of ICL. For reasons that are easy to understand, this particular variant is the 
form now emerging as the preferred type of ICL in many countries. There is also a 
growing interest, and expanding practice, in the use of income related instruments for 
higher education financed through the private sector, so-called human capital contracts. 
The nature of schemes that have been tried in different countries is documented, 
and the essential characteristics of the various approaches are compared and contrasted. 
However, the available data and evidence on the effects of ICL are limited, the reason 
being that in most countries ICL have been adopted only recently. Even so, for one 
country, Australia, there has now been a significant amount of research into the 
consequences of a risk-sharing ICL, and the evidence is explored in some detail. The 
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nature of the investigation into the Australian experience helps in the development of a 
research agenda for other national environments. 
The essential policy challenges of administration and collection are raised through 
an examination of the nature of the issues concerning the adoption of ICL in developing 
countries. The bottom line in this context is that efficient collection lies at the heart of 
this type of policy reform. It also seems to be the case that in many institutional and 
political environments there is not yet the administrative sophistication to make ICLs 
administratively viable, although for reasons documented this is unlikely to be the case 
for the vast majority of OECD countries. 
For a Chapter in the Handbook of Economics series, the discussion following has 
a strong policy focus, and this can be traced in part to the absence of a major theoretical 
and empirical literature in the area of ICL. This is good news for new researchers, since it 
implies that there is considerable potential with respect to ICL in all areas: theory, 
evidence and policy implementation. Promising avenues of research are documented in a 
final Section. 
 
2. Charging Students for Higher Education: Conceptual Issues
2.1 Introduction 
What now follows presents the basic cases for some fundamental aspects of 
higher education financing. These include the division of payment between individual 
beneficiaries and society, and the justification for government intervention. 
 
2.2 Who Should Pay in Theory: Efficiency 
The conventional way of analysing efficiency issues with respect to public 
expenditure uses a proposition well known in welfare economics concerning allocative 
efficiency. This is that, if there are no market distortions, goods and service should be 
priced at: 
Px = Mx — Ex 
where Px is the price of good or service x; 
Mx is the marginal cost of producing x; 
and Ex is the marginal value of the externalities associated with the production os 
consumption of x. 
Figure 1 helps explain the basis of this pricing rule for higher education (Chia, 
1990). 
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 Figure 1: Private and social costs and benefits of higher education 
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The curves are all given in present value terms, and an understanding of their 
bases is as follows. The marginal benefit curves slope downwards since the higher is the 
number of tertiary students the greater will be the supply of graduates and thus the lower 
are graduate wages. The distance between the social and private benefit curves reflects 
the value of the externalities, a topic considered below. It is assumed in the diagram that 
the marginal value of the externalities is invariant to the number of students, meaning that 
the social benefit curve is drawn parallel to the marginal private benefit curve. However, 
it is arguable that as the number of graduates increases, so too will the value of the 
externalities fall, a point used in Barr and Crawford (1998) to justify fee increases as 
enrolments increase.  
In the figure the marginal private cost curve is shown for a zero-fee regime, and 
slopes upwards since there will be increasing opportunity costs to enrolling the more 
enrolments there are, given that additional enrolments decrease the supply and thus the 
wages of non-graduates. The difference between the marginal private and marginal social 
cost curves reflects the extent of the subsidy implicit in a no-fee regime. 
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 As drawn the diagram shows a situation characterised by over-investment in 
higher education, (q’ > q*), since it is assumed that there is no tuition fee. However, if all 
the direct costs are paid for by students (a full-fee regime), then the marginal social costs 
and marginal private benefits would be identical, but this then leads to an under-
investment of higher education (q’ < q*). Thus the optimal fee is given by the distance 
BC which is derived from AB, the value accorded the marginal value of the externalities 
and thus the level of government subsidy.  
Of some interest for policy issues considered below, the marginal cost pricing rule 
explained here suggests that financing arrangements that do not reflect the interaction of 
marginal benefits and marginal course costs will not deliver allocative efficiency. It is 
explained that several variants of student charging are of this genre. 
It should be noted that while the issues raised from analysis of Figure 1 sit 
comfortably with mainstream economics, this does not necessarily mean that the 
conclusions drawn with respect to allocative efficiency and taxpayer subsidies are 
obvious and easily analysed. Instead it might well be the case that, at least with respect to 
public sector institutions, the higher education market is supply-constrained and is thus 
characterised by excess demand at given tuition and income support levels.  
In the above context, Finnie and Usher (2005) argue that the framework presented 
above misses an important part of adjustment processes in public sector higher education. 
That is, if governments typically do not provide sufficient resources to allow all 
‘qualified’ prospective students to enter higher education, the role of admission scores as 
an adjustment mechanism to changes in funding and demand is paramount. If this is the 
case the strength of the allocative efficiency issues concerning price adjustments raised 
above are necessarily weakened.   
 
2.3 Externalities  
Critical issues for policy concern the nature of social benefits and their likely size, 
given that economic theory suggests that answers to the latter should form the basis of the 
level of government subsidy. With respect to policy significant issues are: what, and how 
valuable, are higher education externalities?  
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The externalities have been argued traditionally to include, among other things: 
reduced criminal activity, more informed public debate, better informed judgements with 
respect to health, and more sophisticated voting behaviour. 
However, the value of these particular externalities is likely to be small and 
debatable relative to the externality effect of education on economic growth. Since the 
early 1960s it has been argued that in a world of rapidly changing information more 
highly educated workers have an advantage in adapting to different environments, in 
‘dealing with disequilibria’ — the capacity to adjust to unanticipated shocks (Schultz, 
1975; Huffman, 1974; Fane, 1975; Wozniak, 1987).2
Related issues have emerged in new growth theory, which stresses the role of 
endogenous technical change, and the connections between and interdependencies of 
knowledge, innovation and human capital investments. The role of higher education with 
respect to productivity growth is highly complex with educational improvements seen to 
facilitate technological progress, which is the engine of growth.  
There are several (highly related) ways education is seen to impact on 
technological change: 
• high levels of formal education are necessary for the successful introduction of 
capital equipment (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987); 
• the above connection encourages physical capital investments (McMahon, 1999); 
• during periods in which a population is undergoing increases in education there 
will be an effective increase in the size of the labor force, so long as education 
raises productivity (Barro, 1991); and 
• education disseminates information and through this adds to growth because death 
does not result in knowledge loss (Lucas, 1988). 
These notions have received wide acceptance in the economic research 
community. However, the increasing consensus with respect to the conceptual 
importance of these factors, and the likely role of education in them, has not been 
matched with an emerging agreement concerning the empirical evidence.  
Measuring the impact of higher education on economic growth is not 
straightforward. An important reason is that the growth impact of education on the skills 
of the labor force will be determined by both its quantity (that is, higher participation 
                                                 
2 For education to result in social as well as private gains requires that the rents from the process are not 
captured completely by the educated individuals or the firms employing them. However, this will be the 
case if technological change flows easily from one workplace to the next (Romer, 1994).  
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rates) and its quality (that is, the amount of knowledge imparted at any given schooling 
level). Understandably, given data availability, most analyses focus on the former. 
The role in economic growth of both the quality and quantity of education 
internationally are compared in Hanushek and Kimko (2000). They test the extent to 
which educational quality as measured by standardised scores for mathematical and 
scientific literacy has contributed to economic growth differences averaged over thirty 
years across 139 countries. The test results are compared with the effect of changes in 
schooling quantities (as measured by the number of years of schooling).  
They find that increases in workforce quality have a profound influence on 
economic growth. For example, on average a one standard deviation increase in test 
scores adds about 1.0 per cent to a country’s GDP per capita annual growth rate, which is 
arguably a very high impact. By contrast, increases in the quantity of schooling required 
to match this growth rate change seem to be very much higher: that is, to achieve a one 
per cent increase in the annual growth rate of a country’s GDP per capita requires on 
average that workers had nine additional years of education.  
The Hanushek and Kimko analysis does not address the sources of labor force 
quality, that is, in their context, the determinants of test scores. And it is very possible 
that these have been correlated over time with rising school participation rates. As well, 
there is little direct role played here with respect to higher education. To argue that the 
Hanushek and Kimko result supports the role of higher education as a direct growth 
determinant requires a link between higher education and labor quality, an issue not 
tested. 
Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), Gemmel (1996) and McMahon (1999) attempt to 
measure the direct role of education on economic growth. The former finds that a one 
standard deviation increase in the ratio of public education outlays to GDP of the order of 
0.3 percentage points, with relatively high effects from the tertiary education sector. For 
the UK, Gemmel finds that a 15 percentage point increase in educational enrolments 
leads to just over half a percentage point higher rate of productivity growth. These broad 
results are supported in Englebrecht (2003), which emphasises in particular the positive 
role of human capital as a catalyst to technological diffusion. 
An essential problem with these types of studies is capturing the obvious 
complexities in the relationships between human capital investments, innovation, 
knowledge and technical change. Issues of measurement and of timing loom large, with 
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most empirical exercises being constrained to use annual data; however, there are no 
apparent statistical guides as to the length and nature of these dynamic processes.  
While the case in theory for the importance of links between economic growth 
and higher education investments is strong, its statistical basis is not as yet compelling. 
The bottom line is that there is an argument for government subsidy of higher education, 
but with respect to its size there is no agreement. 
 
2.4 Who Should Pay: Equity Issues 
There is a commonly expressed lifetime income distribution argument for 
charging for higher education. The appropriate way of analysing this issue is with respect 
to after-tax rates of return to higher education. There have always been a host of 
interpretation problems in this literature, including: the role of unmeasured ability and 
motivation; the significance of measurement error; and the seemingly strong assumptions 
associated with the use of cross-sectional data to predict the true future return to an 
educational investment. 
However, through possibly the most pervasively used tool in applied micro-
economics, the earnings function (Mincer, 1974) it is by now fairly clear that these rates 
of return are high (Krueger, 1999), and arguably as high as are the returns found for a 
host of other investment processes. This commonly found result able to be juxtaposed 
with data on students’ parents, which invariably find that those enrolled in higher 
education are much more likely on average to come from relatively advantaged families.3 
This suggests that, on average, government subsidies to higher education redistribute tax 
resources to individuals who as children are from privileged backgrounds and who as 
adults receive high individual economic returns from the higher education investment 
process. Barr (2001), Chapman (1997), Belfield (2000) and many others argue this 
proposition generally, and with respect to a host of countries. That is, a social implication 
of a large public sector financial support of the beneficiaries of higher education is that 
such approaches are regressive and undesirable. 
Such a judgement is underwritten by the view that a role for government is to 
redistribute towards and not away from the lifetime poor.  It is also based on the 
judgement that it is desirable to diminish the strength of the already strong nexus between 
                                                 
3 The evidence is compelling in all countries for which data exists. As examples, see Greenaway and 
Haynes (2003) for the UK, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) for the US, Chapman (1997) for Australia, and 
Finnie and Schwartz (1997) for Canada. 
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children’s lifetime economic opportunities and the socio economic standing of their 
parents.  In these contexts the equity case for a charge is clear. 
 
2.5 Efficiency and Equity: A False Distinction? 
In general, analyses of public sector involvement in particular areas of economic 
activity treat efficiency (usually interpreted to mean the optimal use of scarce resources) 
and equity (which concerns fairness and income distribution) as if they are conceptually 
distinct. That is, it is often the case that efficiency and equity are characterised as trade-
offs, with a role for government being to find an acceptable position between these goals. 
However, with respect to higher education the distinction between efficiency and 
equity is not clear-cut. This point is clarified through consideration of the notion of 
equality of opportunity, which is usually seen to be a major goal for higher education 
policy. What the expression means is not always clear, but in the higher education 
context it can be interpreted as highlighting the value of policy ensuring the absence of 
barriers to the participation of disadvantaged prospective students in higher education. In 
an economic policy context, the notion of equality of opportunity underscores the point 
that the distinction between efficiency and equity is in many senses artificial. 
That is, there are both economic and social reasons for governments to act in 
ways that ensure that the higher education system does not exclude talented but poor 
students. The reasons are as follows.  
Poor prospective students can deliver important social benefits given access to 
higher education. That is, if able and motivated people cannot participate in higher 
education for financial reasons the whole economy is worse off, because talent is being 
wasted; there will be a less than optimal delivery of spill-overs, as well as foregone 
private opportunities for the excluded poor. Both Barr (2001) and Palacios (2004) 
emphasise these issues. 
In terms of equity and distributive justice, it needs to be recognised that there is 
already a strong nexus between the family circumstances of children and their lifetime 
income prospects. Thus, if a society values equality of opportunity it should ensure that 
the strength of this nexus is not reinforced by education policy. 
With this as background it is now useful to explore the shortcoming of the market 
that constitutes an overwhelming case for some sort of government intervention. 
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2.6 The Need for Government Intervention: Capital Market ‘Failure’ 
Given that a critical aim of a higher education financing system is to not erect 
barriers to the participation of talented but poor students, what problems would arise in 
the absence of government intervention? That is, is the right approach for the government 
to decide the size of the per student subsidy, pay this to higher education institutions 
which would then require students to pay fees on enrolment? 
There are major problems with this arrangement, traceable in most instances to 
issues of uncertainty and risk, an issue first raised by Friedman (1955). The argument can 
be best understood with reference to the nexus between labor markets and human capital 
investments. The essential point is that educational investments are risky, with the main 
areas of uncertainty being as follows (Barr, 2001), and Palacios, 2004): 
• Enrolling students do not know fully their capacities for (and perhaps even true 
interest in) the higher education discipline of their choice. This means in an 
extreme they cannot be sure that they will graduate and, in Australia for example, 
around 25 per cent of enrolments end up without a qualification. 
• Even given that course completion is expected, students will not be aware of their 
likely relative success in the area of study. This will depend not just on their own 
abilities, but also on the skills of others competing for jobs in the area.  
• There is uncertainty concerning the future value of the investment. For example, 
the labor market — including the labor market for graduates in specific skill areas 
— undergoes constant change. What might have looked like a good investment at 
the time it began might turn out to be a poor choice when the process is finished,4 
and 
• Many prospective students, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds, 
may not have much information concerning graduate incomes, due in part to a 
lack of contact with graduates. 
These uncertainties are associated with important risks since if future incomes 
turn out to be lower than expected, the individual is unable to sell part of the investment 
to re-finance a different educational path, for example. This is critical in an understanding 
of capital market failure, and explains why banks will not be interested in unsecured 
loans for higher education investments: in a non-slavery world there is no collateral to be 
sold in the event of default. And even if it was possible for a third party to own and sell 
                                                 
4 Freeman’s (1971) ‘cobweb’ model of college training is apposite in this context. 
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human capital, its future value might turn out to be quite low taking into account the 
above possibilities. The point is taken up further below. 
Thus, given these uncertainties, very risk-averse potential students will be 
reluctant to finance higher educational investments. It is likely that those with relatively 
low access to finances — that is, prospective students from poor backgrounds — are 
particularly influenced by these realities, given a relative lack of financial resources, an 
underlying assumption being that there are binding credit constraints for some potential 
borrowers. It is instructive to examine briefly the related empirical literature. 
 
2.7 Are Credit Constraints an Issue?  
The borrowing problem described above takes on a very serious form if it is 
actually the case that there are in reality constraints on the borrowing for individuals 
interested in bank financing of higher education investments.  The evidence with respect 
to the extent to which access to credit limits human capital investment takes several 
forms.   
The first area of research seeks to establish the strength of the relationship 
between family income and educational outcomes. The argument is that if there are no 
borrowing constraints to finance skill investments, there should also be no relationship 
between family income and an individual’s level of education. This turns out to be a 
difficult research assignment because of the complicated relationships between family 
income and its likely association with the plethora of factors associated with educational 
choice. These include the quality of compulsory schooling, inherent ability, educational 
motivation and the transfer of values between parents and children associated with 
education. Recent important attempts to disentangle these relationships are found in 
Cameron and Taber (2001) and Carneiro and Heckman (2002).  
Carneiro and Heckman make the valid point that long-run environmental and 
family factors are likely to be critical determinants of a young person’s interest in and 
capacity for college education. In other words, credit constraints will not be the only 
determinant of access to college. They provide evidence suggesting strongly that family 
income is not correlated with college attendance given proper control for individuals’ 
educational abilities (as proxied by test scores). They suggest that the main factor behind 
the family income-schooling relationship is ability, although they identify about 8 per 
cent of the population ‘who seem to be facing short run credit constraints’ (p. 732). That 
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is, credit constraints might matter, but it is important not to overstate their role in an 
understanding of the nexus between family income and enrolments. 
Cameron and Taber provide similar evidence for the above result. With the use of 
instrumental variables and structural equations estimations, they explore the issue of 
whether or not estimates of the foregone earnings faced by groups differing with respect 
to family income have different effects on educational outcomes. Their range of different 
approaches comes to the same conclusion: there is no relationship between family 
background and educational outcomes. 
There are empirical issues associated with interpreting the weakness of the 
relationship between family income and enrolments as strong evidence that there are in 
general low or even no credit constraints. The first, recognised by Cameron and Taber, is 
that empirical tests of the role of family income with respect to college choice are 
typically undertaken in a policy environment with programs designed to mitigate the 
effects of credit constraints.  
Cameron and Taber write: ‘… it is important to keep in mind that [the results do] 
not necessarily mean that credit market constraints would not exist in the absence of the 
programs currently available.’ [p. 32] That is, if programs in operation are an effective 
solution to the lack of borrowing opportunities for poor prospective students no 
systematic credit constraint evidence will emerge with the use of data including program 
participants. Carneiro and Heckman acknowledge that the credit constraint results apply 
in the context of the existing policy environment, it following that their analysis should 
not be interpreted as evidence that credit constraints are not generally an issue for access 
to higher education. 
This point matters for policy assessment, now explained. Suppose there is no 
significant evidence for the existence of credit constraints conducted in an environment in 
which there is policy intervention targeted on those from low family incomes. Such 
analyses might well reveal no, or at least low, levels of credit constraints (as do the above 
reported exercises). 
However, the policy issue concerns the effective use of public sector resources to 
break down barriers to participation, and it might be that current arrangements could be 
improved in this context. For example, grants or loan subsidies to children from poor 
families, while mitigating the impact of credit constraints, may not be the best forms of 
intervention, a matter explored further later. 
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The second issue is also recognised by Carneiro and Heckman (2002). They 
observe that: ‘…children from higher income families still depend on the goodwill of 
their parents to gain access to funds’ (p. 708). This point is critical to an interpretation of 
the relationship between family income and educational outcomes, because it raises the 
possibility that some prospective students from high income backgrounds are unable to 
gain access to college if their parents are unwilling to finance the investment. Under the 
assumption that a lack of parental support from some higher income families has the 
effect of precluding the participation of educationally qualified children there is a 
potential for underestimation of the true size of the relationship between family income 
and participation.  
The different type of approach provided in analyses of credit constraints asks 
whether or not there is a relationship between family income and individuals’ investment 
strategies. Kane and Rouse (1999) explore these issues with respect to both rates of return 
to education and the relative role of increases in tuition. With respect to the first, the idea 
is that credit constrained individuals will under-invest in college and this will result in 
relatively high rates of return for members of these groups. In support of this proposition 
they cite the evidence from Card (2000), which suggests that those from poor 
backgrounds receive relatively high returns to college. 
Kane and Rouse also provide evidence that increases in tuition costs, compared to 
increases in relative graduate wages, impact relatively highly on the educational choices 
of the poor. They interpret these findings as evidence for the existence of credit 
constraints. 
There might be an issue here with their conclusions suggesting the existence of 
credit constraints from these data. With respect to rates of return, the fact that average 
rates of return to higher education for members of disadvantaged groups does not 
necessarily mean that marginal returns are also high, although this potential seems likely. 
Unfortunately marginal returns are unable to be measured from the data.  
Second, as with the Cameron and Taber, and Carneiro and Heckman, exercises, it 
is important to interpret relationships concerning the role of tuition in the context of the 
policy environment. That is, at the same time as tuition increased it might be the case that 
access to, and the generosity of, PELS grants for the disadvantaged also changed. In other 
words, analysis of college choices with respect to family income and costs of attendance 
needs to condition on the policy environment. Even so, the Kane and Rouse work casts 
doubt on a view that credit constraints are insignificant. 
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In a different approach to the issue using the National Longitudinal Study of 
Youth, Hazarika (2002) finds that the proportion of youth at college from wealthier 
families increases in a recession, as measured by local unemployment rates. This is 
attributed to poorer families having lower incomes, from lower employment probabilities, 
in recessions, implying that in hard times they are less able to afford the college 
enrolment of their children.  
The size of the above effect is reported as follows: ‘… among teens with family 
permanent incomes below the median, a one percentage increase in the county 
unemployment rate is associated with a 5.8 per cent decrease in the relative probability of 
two-year college attendance as opposed to a 3.8 per cent decrease in the relative 
probability of four-year college attendance’ (p. 141). However, another interpretation is 
that there is an added worker effect, such that families require their youth to take 
employment to supplement family incomes in recessions. But even this latter 
interpretation might be consistent with a credit constraint story. 
Chapman, Crossley and Kim (2003) report direct tests of the role of credit 
constraints for an unusual sample of unemployed Canadians, surveyed in the mid-1990s. 
Respondents who had not undertaken training after job loss were asked the reasons. 
Around 12 per cent replied that they wanted to participate in formal training but could not 
afford to, and (implicitly) were unable to borrow the financial resources to do so. The 
authors argue that this implies credit constraints influence human capital investments for 
a small, but significant, minority of disadvantaged people.  
Overall, it would appear to be that there are many factors behind the fact that 
children from poorer families are less likely to attend higher education, which means that 
this stylised fact alone is not sufficient evidence for the existence of credit constraints. 
However, there is now considerable research taking into account the influence of non-
family background factors related to access to higher education. A reasonable conclusion 
is that, at some points in time, it is very likely that the existence of credit constraints 
constitutes a financial barrier for a minority of the potential student population. In the 
absence of existing targeted policy aimed at decreasing the role of credit constraints there 
is little doubt that the problem would be measured larger. 
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3. The Case for Income Contingent Loans
3.1 Introduction 
This section examines the case for income contingent loans for higher education. 
It begins with an analysis of why conventional approaches to the credit market failure 
explained above have important limitations. Income contingent loans take many different 
forms, and these differences are explored. An important part of this analysis considers the 
costs and benefits of different types of ICL.  
 
3.2 Are ICLs Necessary?: The Problems with (Government Guaranteed) Bank Loans 
A possible solution to the capital market problem described above is used in many 
countries, such as the US and Canada (Finnie and Schwartz, 1997). It involves higher 
education institutions charging up-front fees but with government-assisted bank loans 
being made available to students on the basis of means testing of family incomes. Public 
sector support usually (for example, in Canada) takes two forms: the payment of interest 
on the debt before a student graduates; and the guarantee of repayment of the debt to the 
bank in the event of default. Arrangements such as these are designed to facilitate the 
involvement of commercial lenders, and the fact that they are internationally a common 
form of government financial assistance would seem to validate their use. 
This form of assistance seems to address the capital market failure problem. With 
this approach banks do not need borrowers to have collateral because the public sector 
assumes the risks and costs of default. However, solving the problem of the provision of 
finance from the perspective of the banks is not the end of the story. Government 
assistance of this type is associated with significant other problems, now considered. 
The first inadequacy of government guaranteed bank loans relates to the fact that 
the loans are typically not universally available.5 That is, usually loan provision is means-
tested on the basis of family income, although for many countries there are also complex 
sets of rules associated with age and the presumed independence of students from 
parental circumstances. 
This raises the important issue explained above and noted by Carneiro and 
Heckman (2002), concerning the role of the sharing of financial resources within 
families. If students are in families not qualifying for a subsidised loan from a bank, and 
yet are still unable to access household financial resources to pay an up-front fee, they 
                                                 
5 Canada Student Loans, for example, are offered to less than half of the student population (Finnie and 
Schwartz, 1997). 
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face the same credit market failure as they would in the absence of a government 
guarantee of a bank loan. That is, means-testing the availability of loans must mean that 
some prospective students will be unable to access the system because they do not have 
sufficient finances to enable them to pay up-front tuition. 
This problem could be addressed by making the loans available to all prospective 
students, since in this situation the sharing of financial resources within families becomes 
irrelevant to a student’s capacity to pay fees. However, universality in the provision of 
loans of this type would be very expensive, given the high public costs associated with 
governments paying the remaining debts of those in default6 (Barr and Crawford, 1998). 
The issue of default lies at the heart of higher education financing policy. The 
default problem has different dimensions depending on the perspective of those involved 
in the process: banks, government and students. 
The problem of default risk for banks is the reason that government guarantees 
are necessary to make commercial bank loans practical for higher education financing. 
But, perhaps ironically, government guarantees increase the probability of default, since 
with this type of insurance there is little incentive for a bank to ensure and chase 
repayments. And since the repayments are guaranteed by the public sector this aspect of 
such schemes potentially imply relatively high subsidies from taxpayers. 
A critical set of related issues concerns the potential costs for prospective students 
with loan repayments required in regular instalments, and not sensitive to a person’s 
future capacity to repay. There are two significant problems.  
The first is that some borrowers faced with obligations to repay loans that are not 
sensitive to their financial ability to meet these obligations might be concerned with the 
prospect of default. Defaulting on a student loan has the major cost of damage to a 
borrower’s credit reputation, and thus her or his concomitant lack of eligibility for (or 
higher costs associated with) other prospective loans, such as for a home mortgage 
(Chapman, 1997).7 It follows that particularly risk-averse prospective students may 
prefer not to take the default risk of borrowing. Moreover, there is important empirical 
evidence to suggest that those borrowers experiencing the costs of default are 
disadvantaged in a lifetime context, and this is now considered. 
                                                 
6 Harrison (1995) notes that in US Propriety Colleges the default rate is as high as 50 per cent. The average 
default rate for student loans is around 15–30 per cent (Wran Committee Report, 1988). 
7 This prospect is made very clear in the poster designed to encourage loan repayments for students 
borrowing in the Canada Student Loan scheme. It is stated that a major reason for students to meet 
repayments is that in the event of non-payment they will ‘risk damage to their credit reputations’. 
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Dynarski (1994) used the National Post-secondary Student Aid Study to explore 
the characteristics of debtors and finds strong evidence that earnings after leaving formal 
education is a strong determinant of default; those in financial difficulties are found to be 
much more likely to be unable to meet their loan repayment requirements. Importantly, 
Dynarski found that borrowers from low-income households, and minorities, were more 
likely to default, as were those who did not complete their studies. Her evidence offers 
important support for the use of ICL instead of bank loans, since the latter could 
discourage the participation in higher education of the relatively disadvantaged, and has 
the potential to punish those students who eventually become disadvantaged. 
Compared to bank loans, a major advantage of ICL is that they diminish the 
prospect of borrowers defaulting. A properly designed ICL has as its major characteristic 
complete default-protection for borrowers and thus the capacity to solve an important part 
of the essential capital market failure for human capital investments. 
The second problem with bank loans as a solution to the capital market financing 
problem is also related to their time nature of repayments. It is that, faced with the 
prospect of repaying a loan with a fixed level of obligations, prospective borrowers might 
well be concerned with future hardships in the event that their income circumstances turn 
out to be poor. ICL solves this problem because repayment obligations are minimised or 
eliminated in periods of future financial adversity. That is, ICL can deliver the important 
benefit of consumption smoothing, a point explained further below in a theoretical 
context provided by both Grout (1983) and Quiggin (2003).8
A final possible advantage of ICL compared to bank loans is particularly pertinent 
to US higher education financing policy debate over the 1990s, and is not directly related 
to issues of risk and uncertainty. It is instead the concern that graduates with very high 
levels of bank debt will be forced to undertake employment associated with relatively 
high earnings in order to be able to repay comfortably their college debts. A concern that 
this would adversely affect the supply of graduates for low pay public interest 
employment encouraged the Clinton administration to introduce an ICL option in the US 
in 1993.9  
 
                                                 
8 Chapman (forthcoming, 2005) illustrates the extent to which an ICL can deliver consumption smoothing 
benefits and this discussed further below. 
9 The Clinton ICL policy initiative is analysed in detail in Section 4. 
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In summary, it seems clear that government intervention is required for optimal 
and equitable outcomes with respect to higher education financing. A government 
guarantee to cover losses for banks in the event of default solves the financing problem 
for the lender, but there are important problems with this approach. The costs and 
benefits of the alternatives are as follows:  
(i) Restricting the availability of bank loans on the basis of means-testing on 
household income (which is the usual form taken with such assistance) has the 
potential to exclude some prospective students because of their lack of access to 
family resources. 
(ii) Unlike bank loans ICL repayments are defined by the borrower’s capacity to 
repay and this feature has the potential to deliver two critical benefits to 
borrowers: insurance against default, and consumption smoothing.  
(iii) Of particular importance in the US is that commercial debt repayments unrelated 
to a capacity to pay have the strong prospect of influencing career choices in ways 
that might be seen to be socially undesirable. 
However, it is important to recognise that there are different forms of income 
contingent financial instruments, and, even within genres, there are very distinct ways in 
which they can be made operational. The nature of these differences and their effects are 
now examined.  
 
3.3 The Various Types of Income Contingent Instruments: Costs and Benefits 
It is important to understand that there are quite different forms of ICL, and that 
they have the potential for considerably different economic and social outcomes. 
Broadly, the different forms are known as: income contingency with risk-pooling; income 
contingency with risk-sharing; graduate taxes; and human capital contracts. Within these 
broad categories there are myriad designs differentiated by parameters such as: the level 
of the charge; the percentage of income to be repaid; interest rates; forgiveness of the 
debt; and income thresholds. Even so, the broad categories are open to meaningful 
comparisons and analysis, and this now follows. 
3.3(a) Income Contingency with Risk-Pooling 
An ICL with so-called ‘risk-pooling’ is one with a fixed total debt for members of 
cohorts involved, usually defined by students’ year of enrolment. With this approach 
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students are obligated to take some financial responsibility for debts that are not paid by 
others in their cohort.  
Like all ICL, the risk-pooling variety offers default protection and consumption 
smoothing but repayment obligations are adjusted ex post to take into account the 
repayment experience of others in the borrowing cohort. This means that borrowers with 
high future incomes, the ‘winners’, will repay more than is repaid by those with low 
future incomes, the ‘losers’, and that the former pay more the less is repaid by members 
of the latter group. 
Thus a risk-pooling ICL transfers some part of the default risks and costs to non-
defaulters and thus have the potential to increase the repayment obligations of members 
of the latter group. This apparently is what happened with respect to the Yale Plan, 
considered in some detail below. Nerlove (1975) analysed risk-pooling ICLs with 
particular reference to the Yale Plan, and explored the behavioural consequences of such 
schemes with particular reference to two major micro-economic issues: adverse selection 
and moral hazard. 
With respect to adverse selection Nerlove suggested that risk-pooling ICL are 
designed to be revenue-neutral this means that individuals expecting to be winners (future 
high-income earners) have incentives to avoid being involved, and  those potential 
borrowers with expectations of poor future prospects have an incentive to take such 
loans, because their repayments will be subsidised by the winners. This implies that the 
cohort of students willing to borrow from a risk-pooling ICL will on average be made up 
of individuals expecting their future earnings to be low; for a university such as Yale, 
hoping to attract the highest quality students, the scheme has the perverse effect of 
encouraging those students who expect to be successful in the labor market to seek 
enrolment at universities offering non-ICL financial assistance.  
The effects of risk-pooling ICLs have also been analysed by Hanushek, Leung 
and Yilmaz (2004). They use a general equilibrium approach to examine the implications 
of different types of college aid, including risk-pooling ICL, on the efficiency of the 
economy, intergenerational mobility and income inequality. They find that, compared to 
both needs-based and merit-based aid, a risk-pooling ICL potentially can result in more 
equal distributions of income, but similarly to the conclusions of Nerlove, such schemes 
are likely to result in adverse selection. They raise the possibility that this form of ICL 
might mean that: ‘… the smart poor end up subsidising the other participants, including 
the lower ability rich kids’ (p. 26). 
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The above conclusion from the Hanushek et al.  analysis leads the authors to 
promote an ability cut-off for ICL eligibility. This idea relies on the assumption that 
prospective students with relatively low measured ability at the point of entry have higher 
chances of relatively low lifetime incomes, but no evidence is offered for this 
proposition. An alternative policy response to the problem of adverse selection would be 
to make ICL borrowing mandatory, which is obviously not possible if loans of this type 
are available only in some universities.10  
The second problem for risk-pooling ICL, also identified by Nerlove, involves 
moral hazard, and relates to repayment behaviour. The issue is that since risk-pooling 
ICL in effect taxes the successful on the basis of declared income, the incentive is for 
debtors to arrange their incomes, or make job choices, to minimise repayment 
obligations. This could take the form of graduates choosing jobs with non-income 
benefits. 
The implication of this form of moral hazard behaviour is that, if successful, it has 
the effect of requiring those debtors who have done relatively poorly in the labor market 
paying more than would have been expected on the level of incomes they earn. That is, 
there is a built-in incentive for risk-pooling ICLs not to achieve the promised levels of 
protection for unsuccessful debtors. 
In relation to these conceptual points Raymond and Sesnowitz (1976) explored 
the extent to which repayment obligations from those involved in risk-pooling ICLs 
might be considered burdensome. Through a series of simulation exercises they found 
that under most sensible parameters of potential repayment, ICLs of these types would 
still leave most borrowers better off in terms of the effect of the repayments on rates of 
return to higher education.  
However, even if graduates are ‘better off’ than not undertaking higher education 
in terms of retaining average high rates of return, the moral hazard point with respect to 
the labor/leisure choice remains. Responding to Nerlove’s lament concerning the paucity 
of empirical evidence on the potential size of the behavioural effects from risk-pooling 
ICLs, Feldman (1976) conducted a series of simulations of the effects of current versus 
ICL financing arrangements with respect to different medical speciality incomes. Under a 
range of plausible assumptions concerning labor supply, his major finding is that there 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, risk-sharing ICLs successfully operating in some countries, and considered conceptually in 
the next section, are able to avoid the adverse selection essentially because they are mandatory. 
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would be a 6.6 per cent fall in weeks worked, equivalent to an effective overall loss of 
about 725 new physicians in the US per year (in the mid-1970s).  
The issues of adverse selection and moral hazard raised by Nerlove constitute 
serious challenges for those advocating risk-pooling ICLs as a solution to capital market 
failure and as an answer to the problems associated with government guaranteed bank 
loans. This seems to be particularly likely with respect to the ex post implications of risk-
pooling ICL. Once graduates begin to earn relatively high incomes it should be expected 
that there would be some behavioral responses to what are effectively high levels of 
marginal tax rates. 
There is an additional issue concerning the efficacy of risk-pooling ICLs not 
raised by Nerlove or more generally in the academic literature. It concerns transaction 
costs concerning how the debt is to be repaid. 
As noted above, a critical aspect of ICL schemes is that of collection. Barr (2001), 
Palacios (2004), and Chapman and Nicholls (2003), point out that there are several 
important conditions that have to be met in order for an ICL to be workable. While this is 
considered in detail below, basic points are that the collection agency has to have the 
capacity to accurately assess a former student’s lifetime incomes, and to be then able to 
deduct debts in accordance with these incomes in a low cost way. This suggests that 
private institutions — such as Yale University — are likely to face major difficulties, and 
these may be significant enough to render non-government schemes unworkable. 
That is, in principle, while an ICL with risk-pooling could be operated within or 
outside the public sector, the public sector has the distinct advantage of administrative 
efficient collection of debt using the internal revenue service (or tax office). This is likely 
to be critical for the operation of such schemes, since the probability of default of a risk-
pooled ICL will determine in part how much winners compensate losers and thus reflects 
the extent of unequal distributions of repayments between different borrowers. Collection 
of ICL, and more generally ICL design, is an important matter considered further below. 
 
3.3(b) Income Contingency with Risk-Sharing 
A different form of ICL, and one typically associated with public sector 
financing,11 is known as ‘risk-sharing’. With risk-sharing ICLs borrowers are obligated to 
repay a maximum amount in present value terms but the extent of the obligation is 
                                                 
11 There is no reason that risk-sharing ICL could not be provided by the private sector, however, an issue 
explored below with respect to human capital contracts. 
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unrelated to the actual incomes received, and thus the repayment levels, of others 
contemporaneously involved in the scheme. That is, the risks of non-repayment — the 
costs of income contingency — can be shared with taxpayers; consequently they will 
necessarily differ between loan cohorts, defined at different points in time, because of 
time dependent labor market exigencies.  
This is a critical difference to risk-pooling ICL, particularly with respect to the 
implications for both adverse selection and moral hazard. That is, it is less likely for a 
risk-sharing ICL to repel relatively more students expecting to do very well in the labor 
market, and less important for those eventually repaying to attempt to avoid the 
obligation if the number in the cohort ‘defaulting’ turns out to be higher than expected. 
To understand how a risk-sharing ICL might work, and in so doing clarify some 
of the behavioral implications of these approaches (particularly why adverse selection 
and moral hazard are likely to be less important problems), consider the following 
hypothetical example, of how a scheme might work. All the discussion is in present value 
terms. 
The government puts a marginal value on the externalities of x, and for reasons of 
economic efficiency (see Section 2 above) sets tuition for a public sector university at t, 
where t = MC — x (with MC being the marginal cost of the course). Let us assume that 
the government knows that with respect to all students undertaking an ICL, some 
proportion, d, of total loan outlays, has not been repaid in the past. So, in order to cover 
this exigency, on average the government requires a student undertaking a tuition ICL to 
commit ex ante to repaying (1 + d)t. Ex post, if the parameters have been set accurately, 
the government receives in total the full tuition payment t.  
With this arrangement some former students (the successful ones) will pay more 
than t, and some former students (the unsuccessful ones) will obviously pay less than this 
(including a small number who repay nothing).12 If the parameters have been set 
incorrectly, and total repayments lost through default turn out to be higher than dt, 
taxpayers cover this additional cost. This is the sense in which taxpayers are ‘sharing’ the 
risk and, in this circumstance, non-college going taxpayers in aggregate will lose. If the 
parameters have been set incorrectly in the other direction, and repayments lost through 
default turn out to be lower than dt, taxpayers receive this windfall. In this circumstance 
taxpayers in aggregate will win. 
                                                 
12 Note that the arrangement can still be attractive to all potential students because ICL offer default-
protection. 
 23
 The critical point is that, unlike with respect to a risk-pooling ICL, with risk-
sharing ICL there are no down side risks for any of the borrowers. That is, if the 
government receives lower than expected repayments there are no associated penalties 
for borrowers.13 Nor are there any rewards to borrowers if the opposite turns out to be the 
case. 
The advantage of this type of ICL is that some part of the adverse selection and 
moral hazard associated with risk-pooling ICL can be avoided. However, even with a 
risk-sharing ICL there is an element of adverse selection, since some prospective 
borrowers, those who expect with confidence to be high earners, may prefer to undertake 
different financing strategies to avoid paying the additional impost, dt. Because of this it 
is in the interest of the policy-maker to have in place mechanisms and collection 
parameters resulting in a small d. The importance of adverse selection issue can also be 
minimised through the mandatory ICL collection of tuition, such as happens in Australia.  
The examples of risk-shared ICLs best known are those initiated in Australia in 
1989, New Zealand in 1991 and the UK in 1997 (extended in 2003). But even within this 
category, it is clear that the forms of ICLs in these countries differ in important 
dimensions and thus with respect to their likely economic and educational consequences. 
With this important caveat in mind, there are still significant broadly based theoretical 
insights available with respect to risk-sharing ICLs. 
Conceptual issues are important to this discussion. As background, it is useful to 
understand that before the 1990s research on the return to education or human capital 
investments had proceeded in two directions. Labor economists were building 
increasingly sophisticated models based on expected utility maximisation (eg, Levhari 
and Weiss, 1974; Eaton and Rosen, 1980; and Paroush, 1976). Most researchers, 
however, continued to use rates of return calculations (eg, Psacharopoulos, 1973, 1985) 
with scant attention being paid to the private and social risks associated with the 
investment. 
Chia (1990) attempted to combine these two strands of research by developing a 
simple framework whereby the risks associated with investment in higher education can 
be readily incorporated into conventional measures of profitability, such as the net 
present value. Coming at the issue of rates of return in this way allowed Chia to develop a 
                                                 
13 The point is made in different terms by Johnstone (1972b). 
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framework robust enough to calculate the benefits to the borrower of risk-sharing ICLs, 
now explained. 
The essence of Chia’s work was to use an expected utility framework to estimate 
an uncertainty premium, which was then used to adjust the net present value resulting 
from investment in higher education. This allowed him to quantify the  ‘insurance 
content’ of an ex post income-contingent fee scheme (of the risk-sharing variety) and to 
compare this calculation with the payment of fees with no insurance for both given levels 
of uncertainty and with respect to a range of risk aversion.  
Chia found that if individuals are uncertain of their ability (and thus face greater 
uncertainty in potential income streams as a result) they would prefer an income-
contingent fee scheme to paying up-front fees. The ‘insurance content’ of the income-
contingent scheme could, in some instances, amount to more than the equivalent of a 
year’s fees. On the other hand, if individuals are fully aware of their abilities, then those 
with high abilities would prefer to pay their fees up-front while the less able would opt 
for the income-contingent scheme. It should be recognised that there are, of course, forms 
of uncertainty unrelated to an individual’s ability, such as the future state of the labor 
market, meaning that even those fully aware of their individual capacities will not be able 
to predict their lifetime incomes. 
Grout (1983) presented a version of the Arrow (1973a, 1973b) discrimination 
model with imperfect information and showed that ‘… an element of income contingency 
will offset to some extent the misallocation of educational resources resulting from 
imperfect expectations’. Similar to Chia’s result concerning ability, he showed that the 
benefit of risk-sharing ICLs are greater the less certain individuals are of their future 
incomes and the greater is risk aversion. From Grout’s simulation exercises ICLs seem to 
have the most propitious leverage in terms of the reduction of the costs of uncertainty. 
That is, the effect of ICLs on welfare even given a significant range of risk aversion are 
relatively small compared to their benefits in terms of minimising the effects of 
uncertainty. 
Quiggin (2003) extends these results, showing that educational financing schemes 
with income-contingent repayments provide a mixture of consumption-smoothing 
benefits and insurance against the uncertain outcomes of risky educational investments. 
Using a conventional two period modelling approach with risk aversion and imperfect 
information, Quiggin establishes that educational financing schemes with income-
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contingent repayment will enhance welfare relative to the alternative of up-front fees 
yielding the same revenue in present value terms.  
Quiggin also demonstrates that the form of ICL with the best welfare properties 
has a threshold below which no repayments are required, since the threshold delivers the 
highest level of consumption smoothing.. However, there is a critical trade-off with 
respect to the design of an ICL, at least with respect to risk-neutral individuals: there is an 
insurance effect, which is welfare improving, and there is a subsidy effect, which is 
welfare reducing. This promotes for policy consideration the critical role played by the 
choice of collection parameters: if they are insufficiently generous there will be 
inadequate insurance provision; but if they offer considerable protection the associated 
subsidies will be too high. This is a critical trade-off for the design of such schemes. 
Moen (1998) analyses variants of risk-sharing ICLs using an equilibrium search 
model of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides variety. His analysis begins with the 
familiar point that human capital investments are irreversible, and he shows that given 
this irreversibility, investments will be less than optimal unless ex post those investing are 
able to share the costs of job search.  
He illustrates that this is possible with an ICL in which the interest rate on the 
debt is zero in periods of unemployment. In this model the costs of job search are shared 
and the essential financing problem is addressed. The question of whether or not this is a 
large or small issue for policy should be addressed by noting that graduates in fact spend 
very little time over their lifetimes in unemployment, even though they may be involved 
in extensive periods of search for preferred employment. It is arguable that the Moen 
result could be generalised to other periods of graduate job search characterised by the 
receipt of relatively low wages. 
The overall conclusion from these somewhat different modelling approaches is 
the same: an ICL risk-sharing system is in general welfare increasing compared to either 
bank loans or up-front fees. The greater are both risk-aversion and uncertainty, the 
stronger are these results. Moreover, these analyses focus on economic efficiency with 
the conclusions implicitly giving no weight to the potential for ICLs of this type to 
contribute propitiously in equity terms. This suggests that the relatively high welfare 
properties of risk-sharing ICLs implied understate the overall social benefits of these 
types of approaches to higher education financing. 
There is a caveat to the general thrust of the analytical results. This is that the 
greater is the insurance protection offered (through, for example, having a very high first 
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income-threshold of repayment, or a very low nominal rate of interest on the debt), the 
less likely is an ICL to achieve a social optimum. This is the result of risk-sharing 
arrangements offering relatively higher taxpayer subsidies as a trade-off to the provision 
of default-protection for borrowers. 
 
3.3(c) Graduate Taxes 
A very different form of an income contingent instrument, and one that has yet to 
be implemented, is known as a graduate tax. A GT takes the following broad form. 
Graduates (or former students, more generally) agree to repay a proportion of 
their incomes, say 2 per cent per year, for a given length of time (which could be as long 
as a lifetime). Thus they share the essential ingredients of both risk-pooling and risk-
sharing ICLs, which is that ‘loan’ payments are made in such a way as to ensure default-
protection. They can be designed to raise considerable revenue, even at the same time as 
their influence on returns to higher education are not affected significantly, a point made 
by Lincoln and Walker (1995) through some plausible simulations. 
However, there are significant differences between GTs and ICLs. The most 
obvious is that the former are in no sense based on cost-recovery. This can lead to the so-
called ‘Mick Jagger’ problem, as explained in Barr (2001). The lead singer of the Rolling 
Stones rock band studied for a short time at the London School of Economics. If a GT 
was applied to his income for life (and if it could be collected), Mr Jagger’s payments 
would massively exceed the direct costs of his higher education, even by several hundred 
fold. The example is very extreme, but serves to illustrate that the revenue collected can 
be seen to be excessive in many cases, and also unrelated to the benefits accruing from 
higher education.  
A second and related difference is that for very high earners the fact that the GT is 
on-going, that is, an addition to income tax, suggests that are much higher work 
disincentives from this form of payment than there would be for a risk-sharing ICL (Barr, 
2001). This is a variant of the moral hazard problem associated with risk-pooling ICLs 
raised by Nerlove (1975) and given empirical content by Feldman (1976). 
Third, the revenue from GTs will not reflect marginal cost pricing rules, and nor 
do the resources received have the any resource allocative implications — instead they 
are essentially a device designed to raise money from the direct beneficiaries of higher 
education. The incapacity of GTs to influence economic efficiency is highlighted in both 
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Barr (2001) and Greenaway and Haynes (2003) as a major reason to prefer different 
forms of income contingent instruments, such as a risk pooling ICL. 
The major possible benefit of a GT is that the arrangement has the potential to 
deliver considerable resources to the public sector, much more than is the case with 
respect to ICLs. As well, and associated with this, if collected efficiently and fairly, GTs 
will generally provide the highest level of progressivity in a lifetime sense since 
graduates with the highest incomes will pay more than they would under alternative 
financing arrangements. On the other hand, the fact that GT payments will exceed public 
sector outlays for many graduates suggests that they are unlikely to have propitious 
resource allocation implications.  
A final point concerning the efficacy of a GT is also related to the pricing rules, 
and has a critical administration challenge as well. That is, should there be any attempt to 
have repayments reflect the time and other higher education resources absorbed by the 
student? While this is a general issue for courses of markedly different length, the point 
applies also to the issue of whether or not identical repayment rates should apply for 
students enrolling in one course only, or not graduating, compared to those completing a 
degree (or several degrees). In one sense this is a similar issue to that raised above 
concerning marginal cost pricing. 
 
3.3(d) Human Capital Contracts 
There has been recent interest in whether private firms could be involved in 
financial arrangements in which payments are tied to the borrower’s income. Proponents 
of these arrangements question the notion that it should only be the public sector, and not 
the private sector, sharing in the risk involved with ICL schemes.  That is, some analysts 
argue that there are circumstances in which governments could let the investment and 
risk-taking of investments in education be placed solely in private hands.  Moreover, 
private involvement could take place with or without a framework of national higher 
education financing assistance.  
The most common incarnation of the above idea is a contract that specifies a 
percentage of income to be paid over a predetermined time period. With such an 
arrangement the instrument takes a form similar to a GT (with the additional twist that 
the percentage is determined by the amount paid in the ‘borrowing’ period).  This way, a 
high earner would pay more than was borrowed and a low earner would pay less.  From 
the investor’s perspective, the loan resembles a significant investment in the borrower’s 
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earning power.  In the spirit of recognizing the nature of the lender’s investment, 
arrangements of this type have been called human capital contracts (HCC) by those 
interested in private investments in education.  
Palacios (2004) argues that these instruments would promote efficiency in the 
higher education market by increasing the information available about future earnings 
with respect to different universities and fields of study.  The contracts would therefore 
reflect market expectations of students’ future earnings, thereby creating an observable 
‘market value’ for different types of education or different cohorts of individuals.  He 
adds that this information would also create a market instrument for measuring the value 
of the insurance implicit in ICLs, thereby introducing a market measure of the extra d that 
governments should ask students to pay to compensate the losses on an ICL. 
Recognizing the possibility that using loans whose payments are tied to income 
may mitigate income risk, there have been a few attempts to understand the personal 
financial impacts from the borrower’s perspective.  Rather than using aggregate data to 
infer the needs of borrowers, these studies have applied financial decision theory to the 
market for loans.  
Carver (2003) creates a model of individual choice for loans to explore 
preferences among different loan alternatives.  In the model, utility maximizing 
borrowers with uncertain income prospects consider the effect of both standard debt and 
percentage of income loans (HCC) on the probability distribution of the NPV of future 
income.  The borrower receives funding from a risk neutral lender who offers prices for 
debt and HCC funding.  The model shows that according to Pareto criteria, optimal 
contracts can consist of: (i) all standard debt; (ii) all HCC funding; or (iii) some 
combination of debt and HCC. 
The type of contract that is optimal depends on the lender’s beliefs about the 
borrower’s income prospects, the borrower’s beliefs about his own income prospects and 
also the borrower’s degree of risk aversion.  He then goes on to suggest that the 
individual borrowing decision can be made in a manner similar to the corporate 
borrowing decision.  The results indicate that borrowers who are more uncertain about 
future income or who are risk averse about future income prospects will choose to raise 
money by pledging percentages of income rather than taking on standard debt. Carver’s 
model can be adapted to arrive at the same conclusions for HCCs as Chia reaches with 
respect to risk-sharing ICLs. 
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HCC are now in operation, with the first business formed known as 
MyRichUncle, founded by Vishal Garg and Raza Khan, in the US in 2002. MyRichUncle 
began with a subset of engineering students at the University of California, San Diego. 
To minimise problems of adverse selection, eligibility for the contract is determined in 
part through academic merit. Repayments of the obligation are remitted directly to the 
company, with amounts validated through the provision of income information made 
available to the IRS. This is bound to be less efficient than would be a direct deduction, 
as operates in Australia, New Zealand and other countries, but the principle of default 
protection remains intact. 
 
3.4 Summary 
Market failure in the provision of resources for human capital investments is a 
critical issue for higher education financing policy. Given the presence of credit 
constraints associated with a lack of collateral to underwrite human capital investment 
borrowing, there is a case for government intervention. One typical way in which this 
issue is addressed takes the form of guarantees for bank loans.  
However, there are important shortcomings with this approach. First, loans will 
not be universally available, suggesting that some students with unwilling families will 
not be able to borrow, and will thus face the inequities and difficulties associated with the 
payment of up-front tuition. Second, the costs for the public sector can be high, due to 
student default. Third, some risk averse potential students will not be prepared to 
undertake loans with repayment burdens which are insensitive to a student’s future 
capacity to pay. And four, there might well be socially unproductive career choices made 
by graduates facing very high loan repayments that are not sensitive to capacity to pay. 
These shortcomings imply strongly that some other approach to the capital market 
problem is required. 
Income contingent loans offer a potential solution. An ICL requires a student to 
repay a debt depending on the level of their future incomes. Their essential benefit is that, 
if properly designed, they can eliminate the prospect of default and in so doing address 
the basic capital market failure. 
It has been explained that here are several forms of income contingent financing 
instruments: risk-pooling, risk-sharing, graduate taxes and human capital contracts. The 
discussion has illustrated major differences between, and complexities within, all genres.  
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ICLs with risk-pooling are characterised by adverse selection in terms of who 
chooses to be involved in such schemes, and moral hazard with respect to the 
labor/leisure choice once the repayment period begins. ICLs with risk-sharing can avoid 
these problems, but are associated with trade-offs between offering insurance against risk 
for the student: the greater is the insurance provided, the higher necessarily is the degree 
of public sector subsidy.  
GTs have little prospect of allocative efficiency because there are no economic 
benefits delivered to institutions from price competition. However, GTs offer what is 
arguably the most progressive basis of the collection of charges. GTs do not yet exist. 
A recent innovative instrument involving only the private sector is known as 
human capital contracts. These arrangements are between students and a financing 
company, in which the former is given a sum of money for tuition and living expenses in 
return for a contractual obligation to pay the lender a percentage of income for a pre-
determined period after graduation. HCCs thus involve risk-sharing — with the risk 
burden being assumed by the lender — and are more a form of equity than they are debt. 
There are now several examples of operating HCCs, and a burgeoning research literature 
(see particularly Palacios 2004, and Carver, 2003). 
 
4. Income Contingent Loans: International Applications
4.1 Background 
A typical Chapter in the Handbook of Economics series takes the form of offering 
a description, synthesis and critical analysis of a well-defined body of academic research. 
While this has been possible with respect to higher education financing theory and the 
role of income contingent loans, there is a relative paucity of research into the effects of 
these types of financing policies.  
In part this is traceable to the fact that national governments’ experience with 
ICLs is both recent and limited, even though it is clear that policy models of this type are 
increasingly becoming a new way for higher education financing policy. It is also due in 
part to the fact that there is often only poor data available, for example, with respect to 
the access of the disadvantaged to higher education. 
As well as the relative paucity of both evidence and analysis concerning ICLs, 
there are also research limitations with respect to the effects of particular variants of 
ICLs. For example, there is only one well-reported example of a risk-pooling ICL, which 
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is the Yale Plan. As well, a graduate tax has not been instituted anywhere at this stage. 
Finally, for only one country, Australia, is there a substantial body of research on the 
operation and effects of the most common ICL, the risk-sharing form.14  
An implication is that the discussion following is uneven in terms of the coverage 
of recent experience with ICLs. However, significant space is given in Section 6 to the 
reporting and analysis of Australia’s risk-sharing ICL. It is the only example in which 
there has been considerable research with respect to the many empirical and 
administrative policy issues raised concerning ICL schemes. 
 
4.2 The International Experience with ICLs in Brief 
4.2(a) The Yale Plan 
Yale University introduced an ICL in 1972, extended in 1976 but discontinued 
several years later. Apart from loans being repaid depending on income, the scheme had 
the feature of borrowing being of a ‘group loans’ form, in which there was mutual 
responsibility between members with respect to the repayment of the total debt. That is, 
the Yale scheme was a risk-pooling ICL. 
Individual repayments were not unlimited, however, with a cap being defined at 
150 per cent of the borrower’s loan. This then became a ‘buy-out’ option for former 
students wishing to discontinue in the program (Palacios, 2004). Even so, risk-pooling 
necessarily meant that high income earners covered the unpaid debts of low income 
earners and those who defaulted for other reasons. 
Initial default rates of 15 per cent exceeded expectations, and this had an 
unfortunate behavioral implication. This was to encourage those remaining in the scheme 
to avoid repayments as well, increasing the burden further for those not so doing. These 
effects are close to what would be expected with the moral hazard issue raised by 
Nerlove (1975). 
One of the major problems with the Yale scheme was that the university acted as 
the collection agency. However, an educational institution is poorly equipped to 
efficiently enforce the payment of income contingent loans, and this lack of expertise 
effectively encouraged and reinforced the sense of inequity of those Yale debtors 
remaining in the scheme. The critical role of administration and collection is taken up 
further below. 
                                                 
14 The New Zealand experience is becoming more studied, but is still relatively poor with respect to 
questions of access. 
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4.2(b) Sweden 
In Sweden in 1988 the government’s student assistance scheme had both a grant 
and a loans component (Morris, 1989). The repayment arrangements were of the 
conventional type except that at low levels of income former students were allowed to 
defer repayments. There was evidence of student concerns about repayments at the time 
(Morris, 1989). 
The scheme was changed in 1989 to allow a fuller embrace of the notion of 
income contingent repayment. The arrangement is that former students now repay 4 per 
cent of their average incomes over the previous two years. The collection is done through 
an education loans office. There is little available evidence of the effect of the scheme. 
 
4.2(c) Australia (in summary) 
In 1989 Australia instituted the world’s first broadly based income contingent 
charging system for higher education, known as the Higher Education Contribution 
Scheme. HECS seeks to recover a part of tuition costs, and is not concerned with student 
income support.15 It is a risk sharing ICL and is analysed in detail in Section 6. 
 
4.2(d)  New Zealand 
The second country to adopt a broadly based ICL was New Zealand, with this 
happening in 1992. The New Zealand system shares several features of HECS. 
Specifically: 
• loan repayments depend on an individual’s income, and are collected through a 
tax system which made this simple in operational terms; and 
• there is a first income threshold of repayment, after which there is a progressive 
percentage rate of collection. 
The New Zealand arrangements differ importantly to those introduced in Australia. In 
particular: 
• the loans are designed to cover both university fees and some living expenses, 
although there is also a system of means-tested grants for students from poor 
backgrounds; 
• initially the loans carried a market rate of interest, and now interest charges 
depend are subsidised and depend on the financial circumstances of debtors; and 
                                                 
15 In the main income support takes the form of means-tested grants. 
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• universities were originally free to set their own fees, with a maximum level being 
introduced in 2003.  
There have been more changes to the New Zealand loan arrangements than has 
occurred with HECS, and most of this has been with respect to the interest rate regimes. 
While starting with an approximate real rate reflecting market conditions, in 2000 the 
scheme was changed to incorporate a zero nominal interest rate for the period a student is 
enrolled, and variations to the application of real rates of interest were determined by 
graduates’ employment circumstances (Warner, 1999).  
The administrative sophistication associated with the now complex interest rate 
regime might have been expected to add to the costs of the scheme, but it still appears to 
be the case that collection costs are low;16 LaRocque (2005) reports that in 2004 the 
annual costs of collection were around (NZ) $23 million per year, which is even lower 
than estimates for the collection of HECS. 
A potential advantage of the New Zealand scheme is that universities receive the 
tuition revenues directly. This implies that in New Zealand there is the prospect of 
resource allocation effects within the higher education system. For this reason some 
commentators, for example Barr (2001), have compared the New Zealand approach 
favourably with the pre-2005 Australian arrangements, in which ICL revenues accrued to 
the Treasury with no implications for resource allocation. In the 2005 the Australian 
system was changed along New Zealand lines in this regard.17  
There is little direct evidence of the effects of the New Zealand ICL on the access 
of disadvantaged prospective students. However, both Maani and Warner (2000) and 
LaRocque (2005) report data on changes in participation with respect to ethnicity at the 
University of Auckland over the 1990s. The former suggest that there has been a marked 
relative decrease in Maori enrolments, but the latter points nevertheless to a substantial 
increase in the proportions of Maori enrolling over the post-ICL reform period. 
 
4.2(e) The Republic of South Africa 
The Republic of South African introduced an ICL in 1991, known as the National 
Student Financial Aid Scheme. NSFAS was motivated essentially by a concern that 
without assistance the marked racial skewing of the higher education system away from 
                                                 
16 La Roche (2005), Korea conference paper. 
17 The proposed reforms are unlikely to be implemented in the next short period, given the opposition to 
change in the Australian upper house (Senate). 
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non-white students would remain (Jackson, 2002; Ishengoma, 2002). While bursaries 
could have been used instead of ICL, it was considered that the costs involved ‘… would 
not be financially sustainable’ (Jackson, 2002, p. 83). The scheme initially provided 
resources to about 7,500 students, but by 2002 this number had risen to over 100,000, or 
more than 20 per cent of South Africa’s higher education students. 
Resources are distributed via the universities, with preference going to 
prospective students who are both poor and academically able. That is, unlike other 
national schemes, the South African ICL involves means testing on the basis of family 
income at the point of entry to higher education. 
Collection takes the form of former students repaying directly to NSFAS when 
their income reaches R26,000 per annum, at a rate of 3 per cent of income, and this 
proportion rises to reach a maximum of 8 per cent of income per year when income 
exceeds R59,000. In this sense the collection parameters are similar to HECS in that they 
are progressive, but there are two major differences between the South African approach 
and those used in both Australia and New Zealand. 
The first concerns the first income level of repayment, which at about $US5,000 
is very much lower than the thresholds used in other countries’ ICLs.18 Second, in the 
first instance the student repays directly to the lending institution. That is, the taxation 
system is not the first port of call, but is instead a last resort. Employers are required to be 
involved only when a student is apparently not maintaining expected debt repayments. It 
is unclear how much this adds to administrative costs, but it would seem to suggest that 
collection would necessarily be relatively expensive with such an approach.19 NSFAS 
loan repayments are ploughed back into the system, so to some extent the arrangements 
are self-financing. 
 
4.2(f) The UK 
Higher education financing policy over the last 15 years or so in the UK has been 
characterised by considerable instability. Until very recently there were no tuition 
charges, but such charges were introduced in 1997 with the adoption of (a highly 
modified) version of HECS.  
 
                                                 
18 See Jackson (2002). 
19 Jackson (2002) argues that the annual administrative costs are less than 2 per cent of the total value of 
loans distributed. The more important figure however would be costs as a proportion of revenues collected, 
data not reported. 
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As well, there have been notable changes over time in the value and institutional 
nature of student income support. In the 1980s grants were offered on the basis of 
parental income, but the real value of this support eroded significantly and Barr argues 
that ‘by the late1980s [it] was no longer adequate fully to support a student’s living 
costs’.20
In 1990 a loan scheme was introduced, but collection was not based on a former 
student’s income. The loans were designed to replace half of the support previously 
covered by the grant, but in effect their impact was likely to be smaller than this given 
that they attracted a zero rate of interest. Barr (2001) notes critically that ‘It would have 
been cheaper to give the money away’.21
In 1995 the Conservative Government set up a higher education funding 
committee, due to report after the election of 1997. Chaired by Sir Ron Dearing, the 
report22 recommended strongly the adoption of a scheme based on HECS. It had the 
following features: 
• a uniform charge of about 25 per cent of average course costs; 
• the charge to take the form of a debt, with loan recovery to be contingent on 
income and collected through the tax system;  
• the debt to be adjusted over time, but by less than the market rate of interest; and 
• revenue from the scheme to flow to the Internal Revenue Service. 
The Labour Government, elected in 1997, adopted a heavily modified version of 
the Dearing Committee’s recommendation. In particular an income test was introduced, 
and this takes the following form: students from poor backgrounds are excused from 
paying any tuition, while students from rich families incur the entire debt. In between the 
debt obligation is determined by means of a sliding scale.23 This decision seemed to 
reflect a concern by the government that relatively disadvantaged students would be more 
likely than others to find an ICL a deterrent to higher education participation, a view at 
variance with the evidence from the HECS experience documented in Section 6. The 
important point for ensuing policy development, however, is that the 1997 changes 
introduced ICL to the UK. 
 
                                                 
20 Barr (2001), p. 202. 
21 Barr (2001), p. 202. 
22 Dearing (1997). 
23 Barr (2001). 
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In 2005, the UK Government implemented further reforms to higher education 
financing. The major changes are: 
• the introduction of price discretion for universities, but with a cap of 3,000 
pounds per full-time student year; and 
• the introduction of tuition for all students, but with the poorest being provided 
with subsidies. 
An arguable advantage of the 2005 UK system over that of Australia and more 
consistent with the New Zealand approach is the introduction of some price discretion; 
since universities are able to charge what they want up to a maximum level of about 
(US)$5,000 per full-time course, with the resources going directly to the universities. 
However, it appears that practically all universities have opted for the maximum charge, 
implying no real consequences for allocative efficiency. 
As with the Australian and New Zealand schemes, the UK ICL policy is likely to 
be relatively inexpensive to administer: that is, income tax collection arrangements 
greatly facilitate an ICL’s operation.  
The last is a major conclusion from the adoption of such arrangements in 
countries with efficient, comprehensive and settled income tax collection mechanisms. 
As explained in Section 5, this is far from the case with respect to developing countries, 
where public administrative challenges related to the collection of ICL loom large. 
 
4.2(g) The US 
In 1993 the Clinton Administration introduced broadly based reforms to student 
loan programs (Brody, 1994; Schrag, 2001). One noteworthy aspect of the reforms 
adopted at this time included an option for students to adopt income contingent 
repayments for some part of their loan obligations, with the ICL obligation being up to 20 
per cent of an agreed income basis. Given the focus of earlier discussion concerning the 
advantages of ICL over other loan mechanisms, it is of interest to explain the motivation 
for the introduction of the US approach. In short, the justification for an ICL option in the 
US reform can be traced not to risk or uncertainty with respect to the future graduate 
incomes. 
Instead the background to the introduction of an ICL option in the US seems to be 
the Clinton administration's concern for the job choice of graduates. Specifically the 
perceived problem was that the very high loan repayment burdens of graduates were such 
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as to make job choices in relatively low paid, but presumably socially productive 
employment, close to impossible.  Brody argues that this was the foundation of the 
proposal, and quotes President Clinton (who participated in the Yale Plan):  
A student torn between pursuing a career in teaching or corporate law, for example, will be able to 
make a career choice based on what he or she wants to do, not how much he or she can earn to pay 
off the college debt.24
This perspective is supported by Schrag (2001), who reports Kramer (1987) suggesting 
that the effect of escalating costs and debts for law schools is that they would: 
… be filled with many more students who, as they become lawyers, do so with the single-minded 
objective of milking the profession for all it is worth in order to be able to pay retrospectively for 
their legal education.25
Schrag suggests that law graduates in public sector jobs would typically face repayments 
of conventional loans that were around 40 per cent of after-tax earnings.26
In support of the above, a survey27 of Georgetown and Catholic University law 
students, conducted by Schrag (2001), suggested that up to 70 per cent of students who 
responded that they were interested in public sector law employment said that they would 
have to choose jobs in more highly paid private practice because of their loan obligations. 
US Senate hearings at the time, consistent with President Clinton’s view, documented 
that this was the major motivation for the income contingent loan scheme (Schrag, 2001).  
That is, ICL was promoted in the US as a result of the perceived problems 
associated with the very high level of conventional loan repayments, which is certainly 
not the case with respect to the background to ICL introduction in Australia, New 
Zealand and the UK. In these countries, the regressivity of having a no-charge system, 
the importance of default protection in the repayment of loans, and the need for resources 
to allow expansion of higher education were the principal motivations for the 
introduction of ICL schemes. 
The ICL reforms introduced in the US have not worked. With respect to take-up, 
for example, in 1999 only 7 per cent of the eligible student population had chosen to 
convert their loan obligations to the ICL option (Schrag, 2001). The reasons for this are 
now explored. 
                                                 
24 President William J. Clinton, Radio Address to the Nation (1 May 1993). 
25 Kramer (1987), p. 240–1. 
26 This is very much higher that the repayment proportions of taxable income required in the ICL schemes 
of Australia and New Zealand, for example, of around 3–6 per cent of taxable incomes. 
27 It should be noted that the response rate of the survey of around 30 per cent was very low, raising the 
possibility that the data are an inaccurate reflection of general views concerning the scheme. 
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 The basis for low take-up of ICL in the US seems to have two, arguably closely 
related, explanations. In broad terms these are: the poor design characteristics of the 
scheme; and the government's ineptitude in explaining and publicising accurately the 
scheme’s implications for student debt and repayment obligations. It is possible that both 
weaknesses reflect a lack of ICL policy commitment on the part of those with US policy 
influence.  
With respect to design, the US ICL scheme has several anomalies. The first is that 
the option for students to convert their loans into an ICL did not cover borrowing 
obligations that could be sourced to their college of the government. This meant that a 
graduate with other loan repayments would have to repay 20 per cent of their income at 
the same time that they faced high additional loan obligations. That is, for some students 
choosing the part-ICL option would result in lower future disposable incomes than would 
have been the case with alternative borrowing choices.  
Second, the ICL scheme incorporated an adjustment of a debtor’s income to take 
into account expenditure for necessities, and this was related to legislative assessments of 
poverty levels. Unfortunately, the adjustment to incomes was insensitive to household 
income, the implication being that married debtors in some circumstances faced a far 
higher burden than would be the case for the unmarried. That is, the scheme implicitly 
taxed marriage and thus was likely to place particular loan obligations on spouses who 
have no responsibility for the debt. 
Third, the scheme had an unusual arrangement with respect to what is known as 
‘forgiveness’. That is, debtors who had not repaid their loans after 25 years were not 
obliged to repay their remaining obligations, a feature of other loan systems (such as 
Canada Student Loans), known as forgiveness. However, for the US scheme the slate is 
not wiped clean, with the amount still owed after 25 years being treated as income to be 
taxed accordingly. This could mean for some ICL debtors that they would face loan 
repayments in the final year that were a very high proportion of (or in an extreme, even 
exceeding) actual income. This suggests that the US ICL scheme was not a repayment 
arrangement completely consistent with future capacity to repay. 
The other reasons behind the poor take-up of the US ICL scheme are related to 
government information processes. Two points are worth noting. 
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According to the Schrag survey, only a small proportion of students who might 
have converted into ICL were informed of its existence, with more than two-thirds of 
respondents saying that they had never heard of it. Further, in a related survey only 14 per 
cent of student Financial Aid Advisers said that they ‘Understood the (income contingent 
loan) option well’.28
Further, while the US government disseminated information about the relative 
merits of different loan options for students, some of the data were misleading. For 
example, comparisons of the expected total repayments of alternative loan repayment 
streams were presented with an implicit discount rate of zero. This error implied that the 
ICL option was much more expensive than it was and, because the ICL repayment 
process would usually take more time than other options, it also suggested that it would 
cost more in total. As well, relative loan repayment comparisons of amounts to be repaid 
only give no weight to the value of the default protection inherent in ICL, which is 
arguably a very important feature of an ICL. 
In short, it should be no surprise that the US government ICL reforms have not 
been productive. The basic point from the experiment is that policy design and 
information processes are critical to the success of public sector initiatives. That is, the 
US scheme does not adequately address the issue of default protection, and has been 
inaccurately and insufficiently promoted to its potential users. 
In the US over the last decade or so, there has also been a move by private 
universities towards a form of income contingent repayment of the debt of law students. 
These schemes are known as ‘loan repayment assistance programs’ (LRAP). The 
arrangement, now with 56 law schools (American Bar Association, 2003), entitles law 
graduates to some forgiveness of loan obligations who choose employment in ‘… lower-
paying public service jobs — such as legal services programs or some government 
agencies …’.29  The motivation behind universities’ subsidies of LRAP is clear, which is 
to facilitate the role for private colleges of enabling more lawyers than otherwise to 
undertake periods of relatively socially productive employment, the same basis as that 
which encouraged the Clinton reforms. The effects of these programs are not so far well 
documented. 
 
                                                 
28 Schrag (2001), p. 795. 
29 ABA (2003), Appendix. 
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4.2(h) Chile  
In 1994 Chile introduced an income-contingent loan scheme to replace the 
previous fixed-payment loan system (Leiva, 2002). The loan carries a real interest rate of 
2 per cent, and requires from the student annual payments of the lesser between 5 per 
cent of income and a fixed amount (Palacios, 2004).  
Importantly, each university is responsible for collecting the payments from the 
University Credit resulting in widely varied collection results from institution to 
institution, with average country-wide cost-recovery levels at around 60 per cent, as 
reported in Palacios (2004).30 Palacios also notes that the system is not widely considered 
to be successful, for the following reasons: cost-recovery levels are low, and, the amounts 
available for lending are far from satisfying student demand.  
According to Palacios, Chile’s example reinforces the notion that universities are 
poorly suited to debt collecting, a point which seems to follow from the Yale ICL 
experience. That is, for an ICL scheme to work it is critical that repayment collections 
use a national tax or social security agency. This issue is taken up in Section 5. 
 
4.3 Common Factors in the Successful Adoption of ICLs31
It is interesting to examine some of the circumstances behind the apparent 
successful adoption of ICL in Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of South Africa and 
the UK. Chapman and Greenaway (2003) record there are several factors shared by these 
four countries which might help in an understanding of their adoption of ICL schemes 
within a similar time frame. Two critical aspects of this relate to shared institutional 
background. 
The first is that the above four countries all have in place taxation systems that 
could be used to collect efficiently student charges on the basis of future incomes. This is 
a critical administrative issue, and is fundamental to the prospects of the adoption of ICLs 
in other countries. It is interesting that in the South African case authorities chose to use 
the tax system as a back-up rather than the port of first call for loan collection, but it still 
remains the case that the tax system is available for collection. 
Second, in all four countries there is a similar higher education system, essentially 
inherited from the UK. An important characteristic is that the vast majority of universities 
                                                 
30 This number reflects collection for other types of loans as well, so the collection amount for only the 
income-contingent ones could be different. 
31 The discussion of Section 4.3 follows closely Chapman and Greenaway (2003). 
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are public sector institutions, which has meant that the recovery of a loan designed to pay 
a charge is uncomplicated if the collection authority is also part of the public sector, (the 
internal revenue service or equivalent). Indeed in the Australian and UK cases the 
revenue from ICLs were centralised and accrued to the Treasury without reference to, and 
with no implications for, the direct financing of universities. This has meant that the more 
complicated problems associated with delivery of a direct revenue base to specific 
universities are avoided.32
It is also worth stressing that in all of these countries there was a clear recognition 
that the time for ‘free’ higher education was over (a position not shared for example in 
the US, since charges were the norm in that country). The expansion of the number of 
university places, or improvements in the quality of the service, were seen to be 
desirable, and none of the governments was prepared to finance the required outlays from 
additional taxation or reduced public services. Chapman and Greenaway argue that this 
can be traced to a world wide move towards less rapidly expanding government 
expenditure after about the mid-1980s and, perhaps more importantly, to the recognition 
that university education financed without direct contributions from the private 
beneficiaries is in essence regressive and inequitable.33
It is possible that the apparent successful implementation of the Australian ICL 
helped motivate administrative change in these directions in some of the other countries. 
That is, New Zealand policy advisers were aware of developments in Australia, and there 
is little doubt that direct contact between analysts from Australia and the UK influenced 
the nature and form of debate in the latter country. Perhaps the policy point is, as Kenneth 
Boulding once observed: ‘If it exists, then it is possible’.34
While there have been significant reforms in the direction of the adoption of ICLs 
in the above countries, this has not so far been a shared experience in developing 
countries. This is the case even though there has been a significant amount of attention 
with respect to ICL reforms from the World Bank, the UK Department of International 
Development and other international aid agencies. The following Section examines the 
experience of these countries, and derives conclusion as to the relative lack of successful 
implementation of ICLs in developing countries. 
                                                 
32 As Chapman (1997), Barr (2001) and others note, this characteristic of ICLs has the important cost of not 
delivering any resource allocation benefits from price competition. 
33 These arguments were part of the explicit policy debate in Australia (Chapman, 1997), New Zealand 
(Warner, 1999) and the UK (Barr, 2001).  
34 Kenneth Boulding, unpublished lecture, Harvard University, 1972 (as recalled by Glenn Withers). 
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 4.4 Summary 
There are many recent applications of the concept of ICL for higher education, 
and just about all of are of the risk-sharing form, meaning that the public sector bears the 
costs of uncertainty. There are no national risk-pooling loans, nor is there yet an example 
of a graduate tax. Human capital contracts are just being implemented, but the numbers 
thus far are small. 
There is not a great deal of information or analyses of income contingent financial 
instruments. This is due in part to the fact that ICL policy initiatives are still new, and 
also that the data requirements of important aspects of ICL schemes are significant. To 
address this paucity of information the Section 6 considers in detail the experience of an 
ICL in which there has already been considerable research and analysis, that of Australia. 
Some lessons are already clear. One is that ICL of the risk-pooling variety seem 
destined to fail, and this can be traced to the adverse selection and moral hazard issues 
raised by Nerlove (1975) and others. As well, an essential lesson for public policy is that 
collection, design and information issues seem to be critical to the acceptance and success 
of loan schemes, a point emphasised in a different form in Section 5. 
 
5. Application Issues for Income Contingent Loans in Developing Countries: The 
Importance of Institutional Context and Administration
5.1 Application Issues for Income Related Loans in Developing Countries: Background 
While there have been important reforms in the direction of the adoption of ICLs 
in several of the countries considered above, this has not so far been a shared experience 
in developing countries. This is the case even though there has been a significant amount 
of attention with respect to ICL reforms from the World Bank, the UK Department of 
International Development and other international aid agencies.  
There have been many missions to developing countries exploring higher 
education financing reform, with a particular focus on the possibility of introducing ICLs. 
Specifically and among others, these have been to: Indonesia (1995 and 1998); Papua 
New Guinea (1996); Namibia (1996); Malaysia (1999); Ethiopia (2000); Rwanda (2001); 
the Philippines (2002 and 2003)35 and Mexico (in 2003). A major problem seems to be 
that of implementation and administration. 
                                                 
35 For a fuller description and analyses of these experiences, see Chapman and Nicholls (2003). 
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This chapter explores the policy debate and intervention with respect to the 
developing countries noted above. An attempt is made to draw some lessons from what 
are obviously disparate experiences and different challenges; it does become clear, 
however, that there are broad points of commonality and shared problems to be addressed 
in the reform of higher education financing in developing countries. As a practical guide 
concerning how to go about such reform in a generic sense, a primer is offered to provide 
a checklist for productive change in a hypothetical developing country, the essence of 
which is based on the case studies.  
Chapman and Nicholls (2003) argue that developing countries, with some notable 
exceptions, typically do not enjoy the soundly based, efficient and comprehensive income 
tax arrangements that characterise the policy environments of Australia, New Zealand 
and the UK, for example. Most often, alternative potential systems of collection — such 
as those associated with universal delivery of social security — are also not to be found. 
As well, many countries are beset by problems of corruption in public administration, and 
their informal economies are comparatively large.  There is intense competition between 
various priorities for public finances and, due in part to weaknesses in the taxation 
system, there is little revenue to ensure propitious public administration. 
Where government-subsidised student loan schemes, of any description, exist or 
have been tried, failures and extremely high default rates have induced scepticism about 
the potential for success of any future programs in this area.  The legislative frameworks 
surrounding the financial sector are often weak, archaic and/or undeveloped, with the 
practical effect that there is little legal recourse where borrowers default on loans of any 
kind.  Furthermore, in some countries a culture has developed among students and former 
students that relates specifically to student loans: namely, an atmosphere of disregard for 
the integrity of student loans as legitimate policies. 
Much of the contribution of this Chapter is far from unique, and there is an 
emerging literature focussing on administrative and institutional constraints related to 
education reforms in developing countries. For example, Ziderman and Albrecht (1995), 
Johnstone and Aemero (2001), Salmi (1999), and others, analyse the problems associated 
with the institution of student loan programs in developing countries. While there has 
been an increasing emphasis on imposing charges, and moving student income support 
away from grants and towards loans, the significant problems of administration and 
collection are an important theme of this literature. 
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5.2 The ICL Adoption Debate in Developing Countries: Case Studies 
5.2(a) Ethiopia 
In Ethiopia only 30 per cent of children commence primary school. Student 
numbers fall sharply at upper secondary level, where substantial up-front tuition fees are 
charged. Until only five years ago, higher education had been located exclusively in the 
public sector.  Ethiopia, however, educates at this level only a minute proportion: 30,000 
students are enrolled in subsidised or ‘regular’ places.  A similar number is enrolled on a 
full-fee basis in evening courses and the rapidly burgeoning private sector, however, 
enrolled 9000 students in 2001.  At that point most students paid no tuition fees and were 
provided with accommodation, meals and certain other benefits free of charge.  
In 1990 the national government, assisted by the World Bank, began exploring 
cost-sharing for public higher education students. As was the case for Australia, New 
Zealand and the UK, a major justification for reform was the inequity of a no-charge 
system, it being estimated in the 1990s that private rates of return to tertiary education 
were very high, possibly as much as 27 per cent per annum.36  
The necessary support of various government agencies was initially difficult to 
secure. Furthermore, while Ethiopia has a robust system of public administration 
reaching into many aspects of citizens’ lives, the relationships between levels of 
government — central and regional — are complex, with taxation arrangements being 
somewhat convoluted.   
Therefore an alternative plan was considered, involving the application of a flat 
graduate tax collected as a percentage of salary over a set period of years (for discussion 
of the conceptual characteristics of a graduate tax, see Chapter 3).  This is the simplest 
possible version of an income related system of deferred payments, and was introduced in 
the 2003/04 academic year.  
The Ethiopian graduate tax has the following repayment characteristics:37
• payments to be collected from ex-students on the basis of a formula calculated as 
a percentage (proposed as 10 per cent) of annual income, automatically deducted 
from salaries; 
• the exemption of around 35 per cent of students from payment of the tax, 
including teachers and other professionals deemed to be of public interest; and  
                                                 
36 See Project Appraisal Document, Ethiopia Education Sector Development Project, 1998. 
37 As described in World Bank Sector Study (2003), Higher Education Development for Ethiopia: Pursuing 
the Vision, January. 
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• there is a discount for an up-front payment for those paying on an on-going basis, 
which is apparently 5 per cent of expected future average payments.38 
The World Bank has broadly applauded the new graduate tax scheme, but offers some 
telling criticisms,39 including that: 
• the minimum repayment rate of 10 per cent looks to be very high for Ethiopian 
graduates given their levels of income; 
• excusing a large number of graduates from any repayment obligations is 
questionable, and if they were also subjected to payments the high rate of 10 per 
cent could be reduced; 
• the 5 per cent discount for up-front payments seem to be too low to encourage any 
take-up. 
This last point is undoubtedly true, particularly for a scheme in which the collection 
mechanism is untested and has a high probability of allowing many debtors to escape 
payments. To help ensure efficient and widespread repayments the following institutional 
reforms are being initiated: 
• a proposed collection mechanism to be established within the Social Security 
Authority (SSA), whose core purpose until now has been the collection of 
contributions from provincial and Central Government employing agencies to 
fund the retirement incomes of civil servants; utilising the unique numerical 
identifiers assigned to public-sector employees by the Authority; 
• extension of licensing provisions regulating foreign private companies to require 
them to register with the SSA for the purposes of collecting repayments from 
Ethiopian graduates; 
• formalisation and active encouragement of the extension of the reach of the SSA 
to privatised former Government enterprises and assets, and, on a voluntary but 
strongly encouraged basis, into other parts of the private sector including foreign 
NGOs; and 
• restrictions on the issuing of exit visas to graduates to require them to repay their 
student loans prior to leaving the country. 
                                                 
38 It is difficult to understand how this figure was arrived at, or what it means. This is because, unlike a 
normal ICL in which the debt is obvious, graduate tax obligation levels are not transparent since they 
depend on future income streams. The documents describing the scheme do not clarify this issue. 
39 See above reference, pp. 23–24. 
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Even so, there remains uncertainty that a sufficiently accurate record-keeping 
system can be developed which maintains the records of each former student’s 
repayments and progressive level of indebtedness. On the positive side it is worth noting 
that most graduates are employed in the public sector and, since their incomes are known 
with some accuracy, the income stream generated from the measure can be predicted.  A 
virtue of the plan is that, while the amount collected from each graduate will be related to 
actual income, ensuring the benefits of default insurance and consumption smoothing,40 
there is no need to calculate and track the payments and remaining debts of each 
graduate. 
However, implementation remains the big issue, and the Ethiopia case highlights 
the need for administrative simplicity and promotes to centre stage the importance of 
collection. Johnstone and Aemero (2001) argue that the Ethiopian collection difficulties 
are serious enough to mean that any ICL is unlikely to be workable. To date there is no 
direct evidence on the success or otherwise of the graduate tax reform. 
 
5.2(b) Namibia 
A country of two million people, Namibia has been independent from its 
colonisers, South Africa, since only 1990.  The legacy of apartheid-based policies is an 
education system characterised by racial inequality.  Namibia has inherited, however, a 
relatively strong legal and administrative framework. 
Namibia achieved independence from South African rule in the early nineties.  
The country’s student financing arrangements were a legacy of the former colonial 
regime. In 1996, following sustained and widespread student unrest surrounding the 
nation’s selective bursary scheme, the Namibian Government, in conjunction with a 
wealthy international philanthropic organization, approached the World Bank for 
assistance.  A steering committee, composed of Government and non-government 
representatives, was established.  This committee selected an Australian consultant (Jane 
Nicholls), whose visit to Namibia was funded by the Bank. The consultancy resulted in a 
proposal for a universally-applicable program of financial assistance which was 
subsequently implemented on a national basis. 
At this time Namibia’s higher education system was compromised by a 
fundamental breakdown of the country’s system of student financial assistance.  This had 
                                                 
40 These are considered in detail in Chapter 3. 
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consisted of a bursary scheme designed to provide bonded scholarships and grants for 
students willing to commit to work in the civil service following graduation. Bursaries 
were allocated on the basis of academic merit rather than need, a consequence being that 
the system was unpopular with students. Since severe cutbacks in public sector 
recruitment meant that many bonded graduates could not find work a consequence was 
that many were required to repay the government an amount equal to their bursary 
assistance.  
The replacement developed for the bursary scheme was based on cost recovery, 
and represented a radical change in policy. It is universal, rather than selective, and 
requires those students choosing to take advantage of the assistance to repay the 
Government on an income related basis following graduation. The scheme replaces 
grants with loans.   
The policy reform is designed to provide a leverage point, through financial 
incentives, to encourage students into courses where labor market needs are seen to be 
greatest.  Two types of financial assistance are provided — scholarships, for students in 
greatest financial need and also for those prepared to undertake courses in areas of high 
economic priority, and loans for other students.  These are in two categories: smaller 
loans covering tuition fees only, and larger ones that go to living costs.  Thus there is 
considerable flexibility both for students and for the Government, and this presumably 
matters with respect to influencing student choice. 
The plan involves establishing the scheme legally as a Fund, with powers to 
invest and borrow money, but required under its legislation to take the advice of the 
Government on certain policy matters.  Namibia does not have a taxation system of 
sufficient reach to render it suitable for collection purposes as part of the scheme.  
Instead, the Social Security Commission was identified as a suitable collection agency, 
because of its potential to track graduates through unique numerical identifiers and a 
computerised record-keeping system.  Repayments will be pegged to graduates’ salaries 
and are payable only when a specified salary threshold is reached. 
The scheme is designed to enable students to select the level of financial 
assistance they need, and the Government to adjust financial incentives and assistance 
levels as necessary. The new program is seen by Chapman and Nicholls (2004) to be a 
potentially more effective means of assisting students than the former bursary regime. 
What is not yet clear is the extent to which the proposed collections system can operate 
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efficiently, but inevitably there will be problems. Again, collection difficulties loom 
large. 
 
5.2(c) Indonesia 
In 1995 as a component of its Engineering Education Development Project 
designed to assist public-sector tertiary education institutions, the Asian Development 
Bank decided to pilot a small income related student loan scheme as part of a student 
financial assistance package.  Design commenced during the project’s planning phase in 
1995.  Due to the 1997 onset of the Asian economic crisis, however, project 
implementation was delayed until 1998, when an Australian team, including a student 
financing consultant, Jane Nicholls, commenced work in Jakarta. 
Indonesia lacks a sound public administrative infrastructure that might underpin a 
collection system for an income related student loan program. In Chapman and Nicholls 
(2004) it is argued that the country is apparently beset by ongoing economic and political 
difficulties, its legislative system is weak, and the legal framework surrounding the 
financial system is particularly so.  Thus Indonesia might seem to be a poor candidate for 
a program of student loans. 
In this, as in many developing countries, the history of government-subsidised 
student financial assistance schemes has been vexed. A previous loan scheme had 
collapsed, and this was run through a commercial bank with default rates being over 90 
per cent. Attempts to design and establish an ICL scheme for Indonesia have been 
associated with an Asian Development Bank (ADB) project concentrating on 
Engineering education in twelve selected public-sector universities and polytechnics. The 
initial design phase for the program took place in 1995: implementation, originally 
scheduled for 1997, was delayed until 1998 following onset of the Asian financial crisis 
in that year.   
The central feature of the Indonesian scheme as proposed at the time involves an 
advance of a lump sum (originally $3(US) million) to (BNI) the national bank, which, as 
the largest public-sector bank, has branches on every university campus.  This bank also 
serves as the vehicle for financial transactions between the Government on the one hand 
and public universities and polytechnics on the other.  The funds are advanced subject to 
a detailed agreement between BNI and the Government (established according to a Heads 
of Agreement signed between BNI and the ADB in late 1995). The essential agreement 
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entails the commercial bank having full access to the funds in return for administering 
and financing the loan scheme. 
Following the financial crisis of 1997–98 the proposed scheme was replaced by a 
much less ambitious, small-scale, locally based grant and emergency loan program. 
Funding for the financial assistance scheme was also reduced. While the Government has 
promoted the intention to implement such a program when economic circumstances 
permit, it seems unlikely in 2005 that ICL reform will transpire over the next few years. 
 
5.2(d) Rwanda 
Like many African countries, Rwanda’s 7,000 higher education students receive 
free tuition and grants to cover the cost of board and lodging.  Secondary school students, 
on the other hand, pay tuition fees: therefore those eligible to enter university come from 
relatively privileged backgrounds. University students receive substantial public 
subsidies, and as graduates they also enjoy significantly higher average lifetime earnings 
than do non-graduates (see Chapman and Fraser, 2000). 
The UK Department of International Development financed a consultancy to 
examine proposals for higher education reforms in 1999, involving Bruce Chapman and 
William Fraser. It was recognised at the time that there was an apparent need to expand 
the country’s higher education system and sources of finance other than government 
funding needed to be found.  Resources could then be used to eliminate the up-front fees 
in secondary schooling, seen to be responsible in part for the very low participation of 
poor young people in any form of post-primary education. Ideally, this would mean the 
introduction of deferred payment, not only for a share of tuition costs (for example, 20 
per cent), but also for the grant provided for students’ board and lodging.  This latter 
amount represents a sum almost equivalent to the full average course costs per capita. 
A UK Department of International Development study (Chapman and Fraser, 
2000) suggested that, initially, tuition charges should be imposed, along with a deferred-
payment scheme, with the proceeds being used to help move secondary schooling 
arrangements away from up-front fees. The case has been made that the higher education 
grants scheme is also in need of reform, and that savings in this area could similarly be 
used to decrease up-front secondary schooling costs. A movement from grants to loans 
would seem to be justified if the imposition of an income related repayment system could 
be established and found to be workable. 
 50
Chapman and Fraser (2000) note that the country has a system of unique 
numerical identifiers available to all from the age of 16, and that this arrangement is 
mandatory from age 18 years.  Their plan suggested that upon enrolment, students would 
be given the option of paying their tuition charge up front, at a lower rate, or otherwise of 
deferring payment until following graduation when they would repay on an income-
contingent basis.  The higher education institution would be required to establish a new 
record for each enrolling student who has chosen to defer payment, along with the year of 
study and the course charge applying. 
Rwanda has an income tax collection system that could be used to collect 
repayments from graduates, via deductions from salary made by employers.  Graduates 
could be asked to produce evidence that they have paid their university charge in full.  
Where they have not done so, the employer would be required to keep a record of the 
graduate’s unique personal ID number and to remit payments monthly, along with 
income tax, at the rates suggested under the scheme; for example, of 2, 3 or 4 per cent of 
salary, dependent upon taxable annual income. 
It was suggested that the tax authority (Rwanda Revenue Authority) could adjust 
the individual records of graduates and remit the payments in turn to the Government of 
Rwanda Treasury.  A variant on this scheme would involve the establishment of a 
separate administrative body, which would manage the scheme.  The Commissioner 
General of the Rwanda Revenue Authority has suggested that the organization is 
administratively able to carry out the functions as specified under the suggested 
structures. However, by 2005 no concrete advances had been made towards the 
implementation of a Rwandan ICL and, as with similar cases, there is the real potential 
that collection difficulties as well as a lack of strong political commitment to change, 
loom sufficiently large to make its successful implementation unlikely. 
 
5.2(e) The Philippines  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has had long-standing concerns about the 
failure of publicly financed student loan schemes in the Philippines.  In connection with a 
proposed higher education financing reform project, a Filipino consultant produced a 
design for a program for the public higher education sector in 2001, but this relied 
exclusively on private-sector funding and was considered unworkable. A subsequent 
ADB project, aimed at the technical-vocational education and training sector, was 
implemented on contract by an Australian consultancy company in 2003-04.  The project 
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included a small student loan component, intended as a pilot for a more broadly based 
scheme. Project design specified that this should, if possible, be based on an income-
related repayment principle. 
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines has experienced severe 
problems in the implementation of student loan schemes.  The government’s ‘Study Now, 
Pay Later’ (SNPL) program in higher education, a conventional loan in which 
repayments are made on the basis of time, is offered right across the sector (including the 
extensive private college and university system) but the take-up rate is very low. This is 
due largely to the modest level of funds available to borrowers, and these have not 
increased since the program was initially established in 1975.   
Since its introduction repayment rates have dropped to around two per cent. A 
feature of the climate surrounding loan schemes in the Philippines is that students, their 
families and even their teachers and lecturers often seem to regard loans simply as 
handouts.  This creates an obvious difficulty for those responsible for policy credibility in 
this area. 
Small-scale loan schemes have been more successful than the SNPL program, 
especially in private higher education, where institutionally based arrangements have 
enabled students effectively to stagger the payment of tuition fees over the academic 
year.  Notably more successful — achieving repayment rates of up to 98 per cent — have 
been micro-credit programs in both higher education and the technical/vocational 
education and training (TVET) sector, where students and trainees have been able to 
borrow to meet costs associated with practical work and projects.   
In 2001/02 an attempt was made to design a higher education student loan scheme 
as part of an Asian Development Bank project — the Education Sector Development 
Project.  Design parameters required the program to be financed entirely from the private 
sector: this factor created severe difficulties and so far no credible, potentially sound 
model has emerged, although in the longer term it may be possible to establish a program 
that utilises the administrative structures and the financial resources of the country’s two 
major pension funds. These organizations, however, were initially involved in the failed 
SNPL program, a central reason for the failure being that the government provided a 100 
per cent guarantee to administering institutions against default, thus providing no 
financial incentive to collect repayments.  
In 2003 a small-scale program was proposed for the public TVET sector in the 
Philippines.  Again, this was associated with an ADB project, this time the Technical 
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Education and Skills Development Project (TESDP).  Thus far little progress has been 
made in its implementation. 
 
5.2(f) Mexico 
The current Mexican public higher education system is one in which there are no 
tuition charges for students, and is characterised by excess demand (a large number of 
prospective and qualified students are unable to gain public sector places). Moreover, it is 
very likely to be the case that individuals from the least advantaged backgrounds have 
less access to the system than do others. There is a compelling case for increasing the 
financial resources available to allow increased enrolments and improvements in service, 
and that this should be financed in part by tuition charges.  
However, a challenge is how to redress current inequities and facilitate an 
expansion without diminishing access to the system of talented prospective students. 
Analysts have argued that a possibly fruitful approach would be through the use of an 
income related loan scheme. 
The fact that there is no charge for higher education students in Mexico implies 
that the system is regressive.  There are two aspects. 
The first relates to the socio-economic background of students. Data supplied by 
the SOFES group from the Census suggests strongly that higher education students come 
disproportionately from the most advantaged parts of Mexican society. For example, as 
measured by household income, it was suggested that less than 7 per cent of the bottom 
two deciles of youth attend university, but that this figure is around 90 per cent of the top 
two deciles.  
The second concerns the private benefits associated with being a university 
graduate. This has been addressed in the typical human capital approach concerning 
estimations of Mexican private rates of return to higher education, and the data show that 
these are apparently very high, upwards of around 25 per cent.41  
According to Mexican higher education officials currently there is considerable 
excess demand by prospective student for public university places. It is apparently the 
case that up to 80 per cent of new prospective students each year are not offered 
enrolment, and it is considered that around half of this group are qualified for entry and 
                                                 
41 These findings are reinforced in Roman (2003) for Mexico City, using the National Survey of Urban 
Employment, in which it is suggested that in 2002 degree holders earn around 60 per cent than those 
without. 
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would likely benefit from the investment. Many of those rejected consequently enrol in 
the private university system where, although there is a small student loan scheme 
(SOFES) available, a majority pay up-front tuition without student loan assistance.  
Together with the data concerning socio-economic background there seems to be 
little doubt that in a lifetime income sense Mexican university graduates are relatively 
advantaged, arguably significantly so. Having the public sector cover the vast majority of 
the direct costs is unquestionably regressive. Thus the basic equity point for charging 
higher education students for part of the costs is easy to establish in Mexico, as it is in 
other countries.   
It is unclear at this stage if the pre-conditions outlined above can be met in 
Mexico. The most important of these, the capacity to determine with accuracy students’ 
future incomes, has been explored in discussions with tax officials who have suggested 
that the potential is there.  For example, there is a unique identifier system, with photo 
ID, which is required for employment and which is used in the collection of income tax. 
This is an essential pre-requisite, but additional exploration of the possible successful 
operation of the collection system would be of great value. The reform debate, initiated in 
2003 with the assistance of the World Bank, is currently in abeyance, in part because of 
political concerns with respect to the likely unpopularity of the introduction of a charge 
even in the context of an ICL system. 
 
5.3 ICL Implementation Requirements 
5.3(a) Introduction 
The countries under discussion above are very different. While the differences 
matter, there are several essential policy anchors that remain central to the successful 
development of any higher education financing arrangement based on the principle of 
income contingency.  In this section these general points are now considered.42  
5.3(b) Administrative and legal preconditions 
In Australia and other countries in which an ICL system has been introduced, this 
has been a relatively simple matter from an administrative point of view.  The reasons for 
this are that the public administration systems of these countries feature a strong legal 
framework, a universal and transparent regime of personal taxation and/or social security 
collection, and an efficient payment mechanism. The last involves computerised record 
                                                 
42 A useful addition to this discussion is the checklist for deferred repayment schemes offered in Ziderman 
and Albrecht (1995), pp. 164–7. 
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keeping of residents’ vital financial particulars and, very importantly, a universal system 
of unique identifiers (usually numbers, often accompanied by an identity card). 
Under these circumstances it is not complicated to identify and track individual 
citizens over time and space.  It is not expensive, moreover, to tack onto some existing 
tax collection mechanism an additional function: the collection of payments from ex-
students, on the basis of a fixed proportion of income. 
In the developing world, however, as we have seen, these preconditions are often 
lacking.  Administrative systems are likely to be weak, and often rely on intensive and 
inefficient manual record keeping.  Taxation regimes may be shaky or even corrupt, and 
usually no reliable system of unique identifiers exists. Financial regulation, bankruptcy 
laws and contract laws are often ineffectual. Nevertheless, it is in these countries, where 
social and economic inequalities are usually profound, that even a modest up-front charge 
for higher education constitutes a significant barrier to participation for citizens other 
than the very privileged.   
The economic and political rationale, however, for the imposition of at least a low 
level charge for higher education is compelling: in countries characterised by serious 
inequality the comparative economic benefit accruing to graduates, compared to other 
citizens, is clear. And if it can be done efficiently on the basis of income contingency is 
preferable in economic terms, as explained in Sections 2 and 3. The major challenge is 
how to achieve these positive policy goals in the face of the difficulties described, 
including the ever-present issue of political will. 
 
5.3(c) Minimum requirements in summary 
The minimum conditions ideally required in order to implement a successful 
system are: 
• a reliable, preferably universal, system of unique identifiers; 
• accurate record-keeping of the accruing liabilities of students (while studying);  
• a collection mechanism with a sound, and if possible, a computerised record-
keeping system; and 
• an efficient way of determining with accuracy, over time, the actual incomes of 
former students; 
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Some would argue that a further basic requirement for the introduction of ICL is a 
strong legal framework and functional judicial system.  Indeed, it is hard, from a 
developed-world perspective, to imagine implementing a workable scheme outside this 
context.  
While the above noted four conditions for the implementation of an ICL are hard 
to achieve, it is worth noting that three apply also to the collection of any kind of loan. 
The exception involves determining with accuracy, over time, the actual incomes of 
former students. This particular criterion is likely to be the most difficult institutional 
barrier to ICL loan and tuition reform in developing countries. 
It should also be recorded that political commitment to change is a necessary, 
albeit not sufficient, condition for change. In Australia, New Zealand, the UK and 
Thailand, it was clear, or became clear over time, that the higher education systems 
would inexorably deteriorate without funding reform, and that the main players were 
prepared to live with short-term political costs to achieve longer-term social and 
economic benefits. In some of the countries considered above it is not obvious that this is 
the case; in the absence of a different political landscape there is little doubt that required 
funding reforms will not eventuate. 
 
5.4 Necessary Steps for Implementing an ICL 
The discussion of different countries’ schemes or proposals clarifies what steps 
might be necessary in a generic sense in setting up an income contingent loan scheme. In 
theory and in summary the system might work as follows: 
(i) upon enrolment students choose between an up-front payment, or incurring a debt 
reflecting course costs and living expenses; 
(ii) those paying up-front do not have to be followed further, but might be later if they 
choose to incur debt in following years of study; 
(iii) those incurring the debt are issued with a social security number by the university 
(which has access to blocks of unused numbers); 
(iv) the number a student receives is unique and will apply also to that student’s future 
pension arrangement (if applicable); 
(v) the size of the debt is recorded and the information is communicated to the (new) 
higher education unit in the Ministry of Finance; 
(vi) a higher education debt record is set up, which will be unique for each student; 
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(vii) at the time of employment the former student is required to let the employer know 
what their number is, and the employer is required by law to remit debt 
repayments (contingent on the employees’ annual income and the repayment 
parameters) to the relevant tax authority [this remittance could take the form of 
with-holding, as is currently the case with respect to income tax]; 
(viii) the relevant tax authority is required to remit the debt repayment to the higher 
education unit in the Ministry of Finance, where the unique identifier allows a 
former students’ debt to be adjusted accordingly; and 
(ix) after the debt is repaid in full the Ministry of Finance lets the employer know that 
no further obligations exist, and the employer ceases collection from that former 
student. 
 
5.5 Summary 
The systems and structures most resembling those prevailing in the ‘template’ 
countries, such as Australia, New Zealand and the UK, will not generally be available. It 
should be clear that if the right administrative arrangements are not available the 
institution of an ICL is not viable.  
In many countries there are severe difficulties associated with the establishment 
of ICL policy integrity, credibility and collection. Even so, at the same time there seems 
to be an important economic and social case for charging tuition. Given this policy 
context, both Johnstone and Aemero (2001) and Chapman and Nicholls (2003) suggest 
that it may be desirable to proceed with the imposition of up-front fees and scholarships 
instead of ICL. Johnstone and Aemero (2001) offer considerable scepticism with respect 
to the possibility of applying ICL in developing countries, and the evidence seems so far 
to be consistent with their perspective. 
The case for and against the promotion of ICL policy for higher education 
financing in developing countries can be expressed with reference to the discussion of 
both the theoretical issues and the problems of administration examined above. The 
issues for the policy-maker are as follows. 
A workable risk-sharing ICL higher education financing policy is the approach 
most likely to deliver outcomes consistent with economic theory. That is, unlike 
alternatives such as government guarantees to banks for commercial loans, ICL offer 
default protection for both lenders and debtors. As well, because a student’s loan 
repayments can be designed to be a relatively low proportion of expected future taxable 
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income, ICL offer the prospect of agents making career choices which are insensitive to 
debt obligations. An implication would seem to be that this type of debt promotes 
relatively effective job matching and thus arguably results in higher levels of allocative 
efficiency.43
These arguments rest on the assumption that an ICL can be instituted in an 
operational efficient way.  However, if this is unlikely to be the case, as still seems to be 
the case presently in most of the developing countries examined above, policy-makers 
have an inferior set of choices: to charge tuition without adequate default protection for 
borrowers; or to have highly regressive systems with no tuition. Currently for most 
developing countries the preferred policy appears to be the latter. 
 
6. A Detailed Case Study of a Risk-sharing ICL: Australia, 1989–200344
6.1 Introduction 
The analysis and discussion presented above suggest that, if it can be made 
operational, a risk-sharing ICL is the higher education financing approach most likely to 
be consistent with economic (and social) principles. This raises the critical empirical 
question for policy: what are the effects of such schemes? Addressing this is problematic. 
The difficulty relates to the fact that ICLs of this genre are both unusual and 
historically quite recent. As noted, the first national scheme was introduced in Australia 
in 1989, and while New Zealand, South Africa, Chile and the UK have adopted broadly-
based ICLs of this type, preceding discussion has suggested that there is a paucity of 
information on the implications of ICL in these countries. With respect to Australia, 
however, there has been considerable research on the topic. Consequently, this section 
focuses on the Australian experience. 
 
6.2 HECS Described 
6.2(a) Background 
In 1989, faced with a burgeoning demand for higher education services, and a 
reluctance to finance the required expansion from tax revenue, the Australian government 
introduced a radical scheme of education charges (described in Chapman, 1997). The 
Australian experience with a risk-sharing ICL, the Higher Education Contribution 
                                                 
43 To be valid, this assertion would seem to rely on the notion that ‘normal’ (non-ICL) loans are a non-
optimal financing mechanism. This case has been argued in Section 2. 
44 Much of the discussion in this section relies on Chapman and Ryan (2002). Chris Ryan is not responsible 
for errors and omissions. 
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Scheme (HECS), is relatively long-lived in policy terms, in 2005 aged 16. While many 
other countries introduced ICL after the beginning of the 1990s, HECS is the most 
studied in all dimensions. These are the reasons that the Australian policy is now reported 
in detail. 
In 1989 HECS was characterised by the following: 
• a charge of $A1800, pro-rated by course load, but with no variation by discipline; 
• on enrolment students could choose to incur the debt, to be repaid through the tax 
system depending on personal income, or; 
• students could avoid the debt by paying up-front, which was associated with a 
discount of 15 per cent (later increased to 25 per cent); 
• those students choosing to pay later faced no repayment obligation unless than 
their personal taxable income exceeded the average income of Australians 
working for pay (about $A(1989)30,000 per annum); 
• at the first income threshold of repayment a former student’s obligation was 2 per 
cent of income, with repayments increasing in percentage terms above the 
threshold; and  
• apart from the fact that HECS could be paid up-front with a discount, there was 
no additional interest rate on the debt, although the debt and the repayment 
thresholds were indexed to the CPI. 
While in 2004 its essence remains, HECS has changed significantly from 1989, 
most importantly in 1997. At this time there were three significant reforms. One, all the 
charges increased significantly, by about 40 per cent on average. Two, differential 
charges were introduced according to a students course of study, with the new charges 
essentially reflecting cost differences. And three, the income thresholds for repayment 
were reduced significantly.45
 
6.2(b) HECS Tuition Charges Described 
Students intending to enrol in Australian universities in 2001 faced tuition charges 
that varied by course. The bands are now shown in Table 1.  
                                                 
45 Chapman and Salvage (1998) argue that the last of these changes was the most likely policy variation to 
affect access. 
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Table 1:  HECS costs by band, 2001 
HECS Band HECS cost for each 
full-time year (A$) 
Disciplines 
Band 1 3,521 Arts, Humanities, Social Studies/ Behavioural 
Sciences, Education, Visual/Performing Arts, 
Nursing, Justice and Legal Studies 
Band 2 5,015 Mathematics, Computing, other Health Sciences, 
Agriculture/Renewable Resources, Built 
Environment/ Architecture, Sciences, 
Engineering/ Processing, Administration, 
Business and Economics 
Band 3 5,870 Law, Medicine, Medical Science, Dentistry, 
Dental Services and Veterinary Science 
Source: Commonwealth Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs, HECS: Your Questions 
Answered, 2001.  
 
These charges meant that Arts graduates at the time who completed their course 
in three years would incur a HECS debt of between A$10,000 and A$11,000, a Science 
graduate would have had a debt of just over A$15,000, and a Law graduate (typically a 
four-year course) would have incurred of debt of around A$20,000. Debts are indexed to 
inflation (the Consumer Price Index), and thus there is a zero real interest rate for those 
choosing the pay later option, but initially there was a 15 per cent discount for those 
paying up-front. 
 
6.2(c) HECS Repayment Parameters 
Students can choose either to pay their HECS charges at the time of enrolment or 
defer payment, in which case repayments are collected through the tax system. Those 
who choose to pay their HECS charges up-front now receive a discount of 25 per cent, 
but the implications of this are not necessarily what they seem. Those opting to defer 
payment and repay the debt after graduation receive interest rate subsidies equal to the 
real rate of interest for each year the debt remains unpaid. A consequence is that students 
who take the pay-later option will receive greater subsidies the longer it takes to repay the 
debt (that is, the lower their future income).46 The ‘discount’ effectively introduces a 
blunt form of a real rate of interest.  
The majority of students choose to defer payment of the HECS charge, and for 
them repayments commence when individual annual income exceeds a minimum 
                                                 
46 For analysis of the extent of the subsidy see Chia (1990) and Chapman and Salvage (1998).  
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threshold level. In the 2000–01 taxation year, this minimum threshold was A$22,346 per 
annum, or about 65 per cent of Australian average earnings. Current repayment 
conditions are shown in Table 25.2. 
Table 2:  HECS income thresholds and repayment rates: 2001–02 
HECS repayment incomes in the range: (A$) Per cent of income applied to repayment 
Below $23 242 Nil 
$23 242 – $24 510 3 
$24 511 – $26 412 3.5 
$26 413 – $30 638 4 
$30 639 – $36 977 4.5 
$36 978 – $38 921 5 
$38 922 – $41 837 5.5 
$41 838 and above 6 
 Source: Australian Taxation Office, Repaying your HECS debt 2000–02 
 
What these parameters mean for typical graduates is now described. 
 
6.2(d) HECS Repayments by Age for Typical Graduates Working Full-time 
It is instructive to illustrate the effect of these charge levels and repayment 
parameters on the after-tax incomes of graduates working full-time, by age. In what 
follows the 2001 HECS repayment parameters have been applied for male and female 
students, assuming: they begin a four year Science degree at age 18, graduating at age 22; 
and, after graduation take a full-time job earning the average income by age of graduates 
of their sex. The earnings function data have been derived from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 1995 Income and Household Survey, updated to 2002 Australian dollars with 
respect to changes in nominal earnings. 
The results for males and females respectively are shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
The data of Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the following: male science graduates 
earning average graduate incomes for those working full-time will repay HECS in about 
8 or 9 years; equivalent females will repay HECS after about 12 years. The above data 
are offered to illustrate typical HECS repayments. Of course, there will be a large 
variation in repayment profiles given that annual contributions depend on individual 
graduates’ incomes. Micro-simulation analysis of repayment profiles of HECS illustrates 
this point (see Harding, 1995). 
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Figure 2:  Earnings before and after HECS: males, 2002 (A$) 
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Source: Chapman and Ryan (2002). 
 
 
Figure 3:  Earnings before and after HECS: females, 2002 (A$) 
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Source: Chapman and Ryan (2002). 
 
The main conclusion from the Figures is that a male graduate working full-time 
takes on average around 9, and a similarly employed female graduate around 12 years, to 
repay typical HECS debts. There will necessarily be a large variance with respect to the 
time taken to repay, a natural consequence of an ICL; this issue is now considered in the 
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context of earlier conceptual discussion concerning the consumption smoothing benefits 
of an ICL. 
 
6.2(e) HECS Repayments by Age for Graduates not Working Full-time 
The above illustration of the age related repayments of HECS for full-time 
workers is of policy interest but does not highlight the consumption smoothing potential 
benefits of ICL. This is because the consumption smoothing benefits of ICL repayments 
matter most when a graduate’s lifetime income stream has a high variance. 
Chapman (forthcoming, 2005) illustrates the point by comparing HECS and bank 
repayments as a proportion of annual income for a hypothetical graduate who experiences 
significant variations in income in the 10 year period following graduation. In the 
example, the hypothetical graduate is full-time employed and earning the income of the 
average graduate from age 22 to age 25, then receives social security for 4 years. Then at 
age 29 the graduate is assumed to be employed part-time until age 32, after which income 
is assumed to be the average of full-time graduates of that age and sex.  
The exercise reveals that graduates in the above circumstances face extremely 
different after-debt incomes if they are repaying HECS compared to if their student loan 
repayments are for a bank loan (with repayments thus being required at a constant level 
over time). In the example, the HECS repayment obligation is never greater than around 
6 per cent of income, and zero when income is relatively low, but the bank loan 
repayments are up to 25 per cent of income in periods of low income. The point is clear: 
ICL can deliver important levels of consumption smoothing. 
 
6.2(f) HECS Revenue 
The discussion following relates to the stream of revenue received by the 
government from HECS. As noted above, students have the choice of paying their HECS 
charges upon enrolment, or through the tax system. Figure 4 shows the revenue received 
by the government from 1989 to 1999, and projections of future payments to 2005. 
Up-front (‘voluntary’) payments and repayments through the tax system 
(‘compulsory’) are shown separately in the figure. It is of interest that even in the first 
year of HECS around A$100 million was raised from up-front payments encouraged by 
the (then) 15 per cent discount. The policy implications of this are significant: it shows 
that the introduction of an ICL can provide substantial revenue quite quickly. 
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Figure 4:  Actual and projected HECS revenue: 1989–2005 (A$) 
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Source:  Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Technology, as reported in Chapman and 
Ryan (2002). 
 
Not surprisingly, repayments through the tax system were modest in the early 
years of the operation of HECS. This is because very few graduates earned incomes high 
enough to require repayment. However, income contingent repayments increased 
substantially as more graduates became eligible for repayment, thresholds were lowered 
and a higher proportion and number of graduates faced higher repayment rates. 
Taken together, up-front fee and income contingent repayments through the tax 
system now represent a very significant and growing proportion of the cost of higher 
education in Australia. In 2001 students provided over A$800 million, which is around 
20 per cent of the total recurrent costs. In 2005 it is projected that this proportion will rise 
to over 30 per cent.  
 
6.3 The Effect of HECS on the Access of the Disadvantaged 
6.3(a) Background 
HECS was designed, in part, to minimise the extent to which the imposition of a 
charge would preclude the participation of poor prospective students. This is a critical 
issue for policy, and dominated political debate at the time. Fortunately there is now 
considerable evidence on the effects of HECS on the access of the disadvantaged to 
higher education. Many researchers, including the author of this Chapter, have 
contributed in this area.  
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6.3(b)  The Literature 
Two approaches have been used to assess the impact of HECS on the 
participation of the poor. The first has been to ask prospective students about the factors 
influencing their higher education participation decisions. The second has been to test 
statistical relations on the question of whether or not higher education participation 
behaviour differed between socio economic groups after HECS was introduced, and after 
the radical changes introduced in 1997. Some of these analyses are now described briefly. 
Andrews (1999) measured changes in proportions of first year higher education 
students from relatively poor backgrounds, as measured by the average income of their 
local area. His research showed that the share of students from the lowest income quartile 
did not change after HECS charges and repayment conditions became less generous for 
students in 1997. Andrews also analysed attitudes to debt by individuals according to 
income, and concluded that patterns in Australia tend to reflect an urban/rural dichotomy 
rather than any variation by income. Andrews (1999) concluded that neither higher 
HECS charges nor the lowering of the income repayment thresholds affected the higher 
education participation of poor groups. 
Other studies concerning the participation of the poor have utilised individually 
based income measures. Long, Carpenter and Hayden (1999) and Marks, Fleming, Long 
and McMillan (2000) use panels of longitudinal data from the Youth in Transition Survey 
conducted by the Australian Council for Educational Research to identify the extent to 
which education participation changed in Australia from the 1980s to the late 1990s. 
These studies use an indirect wealth index constructed from responses by individuals to 
questions about the presence of material possessions in their houses at around age 14.  
Not surprisingly, the results of the above studies suggest that wealth is strongly 
positively related to individuals’ higher education participation. While Long et al. (1999) 
found also that higher education participation differences by wealth widened initially, 
they suggest that this trend was evident in the earlier cohorts, and not obviously related to 
HECS. The Marks et al. research (2000) added a new cohort to the same panels 
employed by Long et al. Their research suggests that socio-economic status became less 
important in determining higher education participation in the late 1990s than was the 
case for earlier cohorts. That is, HECS did not seem to be associated with lower higher 
educational participation of relatively poor prospective students. 
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There are a number of methodological and measurement questions in both the 
Long et al. and Marks et al. exercises. These issues are considered in Chapman and Ryan 
(2002) in exercises using the same data sets, and this research is described below.47
As well as the analysis of Andrews (1999), the Australian government has 
undertaken recent research focussing in particular on the potential effects on applications 
and commencements as a result of the 1997 HECS changes. Aungles, Buchanan, Karmel 
and MacLachlan (2002) explore time series relationships concerning university 
applications, and find a small but significant decrease after 1996, when HECS charges 
and repayment rules became much less generous for students. However, there are only 14 
observations in the data, and very few controls. 
The same authors use local area averages concerning education and occupation 
(the same approach adopted by Andrews, 1999) to explore the possibility of there being 
an effect on commencements of the relative disadvantaged from the 1997 HECS changes. 
In general there doesn’t seem to be an issue, except for a small number of males with 
respect to the courses in which the HECS charge increased the most. Chapman and Ryan 
(2003) found a similar effect in direction terms, but it was not statistically significant. 
With what is arguably an improved approach, Chapman and Ryan (2002; 2003) 
address the following questions. What was the level of university participation with 
respect to family wealth of 18 year olds: before the introduction of HECS (as measured in 
1988); sometime after this (as measured in 1993); and after the marked changes to the 
scheme in 1997 (as measured in 1999). 
For each year Chapman and Ryan (2002) considered only 18 year olds and these 
groups were classified into three wealth categories: those from the bottom quartile; those 
from the top quartile; and those from the middle two quartiles. These classifications 
allowed measurement of the proportion of young people enrolled in higher education 
from different wealth backgrounds. Figure 5 shows the results. 
The data of Figure 5 should be interpreted as follows. For each of the years 1988, 
1993 and 1999 the bars show the proportion of those aged 18 who were enrolled in higher 
education from the three wealth categories. There are three significant results. 
First, before the introduction of HECS, there was a clear relationship between 
enrolment in higher education and measures of family wealth. Specifically, the 
proportions enrolled from the lowest, middle and highest groups were respectively 
                                                 
47 Background technical explanations are not apposite here: what matters for the current exercise are the 
additional insights into the effects of HECS on the access of poor prospective students. 
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around 19, 24 and 36 per cent. Second, the data show that higher eduction participation 
rates did not fall for students from any family wealth group after the introduction of 
HECS. Even so, the increase in the proportion of young people attending university was 
clearly larger for those from the middle and highest wealth groups. Third, the large 
changes to HECS introduced in 1997 had no adverse effects on participation for members 
of any wealth group; indeed, there were large higher education participation increases for 
those from all family wealth backgrounds. 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of 18 year olds undertaking a degree by family wealth, persons 
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Source: Chapman and Ryan (2002). 
 
Chapman and Ryan (forthcoming, 2005) report parametric tests of these 
relationships, differentially by sex, and allowing non-linear effects of policy changes over 
time. As well, they explored the effects of policy announcements on high school 
students’ intentions to enrol. Their conclusion is essentially that reached by other 
research: there is no evidence that the introduction of, and changes in, HECS have 
affected significantly the socio-economic composition of the higher education student 
body. 
Hume (2004) has also explored the issue of socio-economic mix changes after the 
introduction of the radical changes introduced to the Australian system in 1997. Hume 
used different data sets – the Australian Longitudinal Survey in 1995, and the Australian 
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Youth Survey in 1998 – to determine if there were changes in the socio-economic mix of 
(different) students with respect to enrolments in particular types of courses. The 
important point is that the charges had changed markedly in 1997, so this ‘natural 
experiment’ allowed an innovative and indirect tests of the extent to which the changes 
affected enrolment behaviours. Hume concluded that there were not discernible 
differences in enrolment patterns between the two survey dates. The result is consistent 
with all other research on enrolment patterns and the role of HECS. 
 
6.3(c) The Research on HECS and Access: Conclusions 
The conclusions from the Australian research with respect to socio economic mix 
and access are as follows.  
(i) The relatively disadvantaged in Australia were less likely to attend university 
even when there were no student fees. This provides further support for the view 
that a no-charge public university system (that is, financed by all taxpayers) is 
regressive; 
(ii) The introduction of HECS was associated with aggregate increases in higher 
education participation; 
(iii) HECS did not result in decreases in the participation of prospective students from 
relatively poor families, although the absolute increases were higher for relatively 
advantaged students;  
(iv) There was a small decrease in the aggregate number of applications after the 1997 
changes, but no apparent decreases in commencements of members of low socio 
economic groups, except perhaps with respect to a small number of males with 
respect to courses with the highest charges; 
(v) The significant changes to HECS introduced in 1997 were associated generally 
with increases in the participation of individuals irrespective of their family 
wealth; and 
(vi) There was a small decrease in enrolments in the most expensive courses of 
relatively poor males after the significant charge increases introduced in 1997, 
although in one of the exercises reporting this result the effect was not statistically 
significant. 
These conclusions raise some important points for discussion. First, with respect 
to the effects of the scheme on participation, it doesn’t follow that HECS per se resulted 
in an increase in the demand for higher education. Indeed, if this were the case it would 
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constitute a curiosity for economic theory, since the result would suggest that increasing 
the price of a service increases also the quantity demanded. 
Understanding the positive relationship between the introduction of tuition and 
higher education participation is assisted through consideration of the theoretical 
framework of Finnie and Usher (2005). The critical point they make is that typically 
many public higher education systems are supply-constrained, and this was certainly the 
case in Australia at the time of the introduction of HECS. The effect of the introduction 
of the scheme was to encourage the government to outlay substantially more resources 
for university places through the promise of higher future revenues. 
Second, the apparent finding that neither the introduction of, or changes to, HECS 
had no apparent effects on the access to the system of poorer students should not be 
interpreted to mean that risk-sharing ICL schemes have a unique capacity to protect the 
disadvantaged from any adverse effects of tuition. Indeed, an important finding from 
disparate case studies, including Finnie and Usher, reporting evidence on different 
systems’ access consequences, is that the socio-economic mix of higher education 
students seems fairly insensitive to funding regimes. That is, marked changes in the 
levels, incidence and nature of grant and loan support systems (and tax and other fiscal 
incentives) do not seem to affect significantly the proportion of enrolments of students 
from different family wealth backgrounds.  
It follows from the above that claims suggesting particular financing systems are 
special because they don’t affect the socio-economic composition of higher education 
should not be taken at face value. This implies that the findings of Canerio and Heckman 
(2001) reported above are robust: access to tertiary education is determined in the main 
by lifetime educational circumstances. If this is so it suggests that the relative advantage 
of ICL lie in their consumption smoothing properties rather than their implications for 
access only. 
 
6.4 Summary 
There are several significant findings from this detailed investigation of the 
effects of ICL in the only country in which such a scheme has been closely examined 
with respect to a range of economic and social outcomes, Australia. 
First, HECS has turned out to be very inexpensive in administrative terms 
(Chapman and Ryan, 2002). That is, while around (2001)$A800 million is currently 
collected per annum, it costs less than 2–3 per cent of this to administer. This is traceable 
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to the facts that students’ debts, and their collection, were fairly straightforward given the 
mechanisms of the Australian Taxation Office — a point emphasised in ensuing 
discussion of other countries’ administrative arrangements. 
Second, HECS has been associated with the delivery of considerable revenue, of 
the order of (2001)$A8 billion over the 14 years after its introduction. It is projected that 
the system will provide around (2001)$A1.2 billion per year by 2005, which will be 
about 20 per cent or more of annual recurrent costs.  
Third, it appears that from a range of different approaches there have apparently 
been no consequences for the accessibility to higher education for students from 
relatively disadvantaged backgrounds. Broadly speaking, the socio-economic make-up of 
the higher education student body was about the same in the late 1990s as it was before 
HECS was introduced.48   
Four, higher education enrolments in Australia have increased considerably, by 
around 50 percent, since the introduction of HECS. This has happened for two reasons: 
there were no obvious overall deterrent effects from the new system; and in response to 
the expectation of high future revenue, the government substantially increased higher 
education expenditure.  
Overall, HECS has essentially operated as originally envisaged, implying that 
risk-sharing ICL can be designed to achieve the basic objectives of higher education 
financing policy. However, it is critical to note that the findings concerning revenue, 
access and growth could also be true with respect to other non-ICL changes to higher 
education financing.49
 
7. Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
7.1 Summary 
This paper has critically examined higher education student financing, with a 
particular emphasis on loans for tuition (and/or student income support) that are repaid in 
a manner depending on students’ future income. Income contingent loans became a 
reality in the 1970s, but it was not until the late-1980s that their potential was tested in a 
national context. A rudimentary form was adopted in Sweden and was followed by the 
institution of a fully-fledged ICL operated through the income tax system in Australia in 
1989. Since then New Zealand, Chile, the Republic of South Africa, the UK and the US 
                                                 
48 See Chapman and Ryan (2002). 
49 This is an important point made consistently by Bruce Johnstone. 
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have all adopted variants of ICL, with differing levels of success with respect to a range 
of consequences. 
In conceptual terms several issues have been explored: the need for government 
intervention in higher education financing; the case for both a tuition charge and a 
taxpayer subsidy; and the costs and benefits of different approaches to funding. It is clear 
that government intervention is necessary, but it has been argued that there are important 
weaknesses associated with the most common form of government intervention, that of 
guarantees to repay loans to commercial banks in the event of a former student’s default. 
The discussion has concentrated on issues of policy, and in this context it is 
critical to understand that the process of investment in higher education is associated with 
uncertainty and risk for prospective students. Because of the risk and uncertainty with 
respect to students’ future incomes, an ICL approach is suggested to have the potential 
for delivering efficacious economic and social outcomes. The essential benefit is that, if 
designed properly, ICL is the only form of financing that offers both default insurance 
and consumption smoothing.  
It is important to understand that there are several different types of ICL and with 
associated diverse implications. The approach most likely to deliver desirable outcomes 
is that known as a risk sharing ICL, in which the public sector acts as an insurer for 
default risk. Within that category of ICL there are apparently trade-offs between the 
extent of insurance offered and the extent of public subsidy. 
On the other hand, risk-pooling ICLs, in which all members of a cohort are 
responsible for the total debt of the group, have major problems associated with adverse 
selection and moral hazard. As well, graduate taxes have little resource allocation 
potential but could nevertheless be designed to raise significant revenue and to be very 
progressive. Neither a risk pooling ICL nor a GT are currently in existence, for reasons 
analysed.  
The international experience with ICLs has been examined in some detail. 
Outcomes have been diverse, reflecting the very different design and other policy 
parameters of countries’ arrangements. In Australia and New Zealand, for example, ICL 
have been successfully instituted, and this is likely to be the outcome in the UK when that 
country moves comprehensively towards ICL. In the US there is an ICL option, but there 
has been little take-up, for reasons that can be traced to poor design and as a result of 
inadequate public promotion. 
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The paper explores several developing countries’ experience with ICL. While the 
World Bank and other agencies have actively pursued this financing option in a number 
of countries, particularly in Africa, there has so far been little success with respect in 
terms of implementation. The associated factors are explained, the major point being that 
the administrative requirements for the institution of ICL are significant, and in many 
cases unlikely to be met without important reform. 
The Australian experience with an ICL is analysed in depth, since this country has 
been the most studied in part because of its relative longevity. In administrative terms, 
and with respect to revenue, access and income distribution, HECS can be seen to have 
worked, although this does not necessarily mean that different approaches would have 
delivered inferior outcomes. Even so, it seems that the apparent success of HECS has 
contributed to the international reforms in higher education financing towards the 
adoption of ICL. 
 
7.2 Suggested Areas for Future Research 
What now follows is a list of potential areas of future research. The approach is to 
recognise an issue, pose a research question, and offer a suggested method or approach to 
address the subject. The discussion follows the order of topics examined in the paper. 
(i) One of the alleged externalities from higher education investment is its 
contribution to economic growth. How should this issue be addressed in the 
context of the existing empirical growth literature, acknowledging that there has 
been little recognition thus far of the role for economic growth of different levels 
of educational attainment? Suggested method: a replication of conventional 
approaches to GDP determinants across both countries and time (following, for 
example, Hanushek and Kimko, 2000, and Dowrick and Nguyen, 1987), with the 
addition of measures of both levels of and changes in stocks of higher education 
levels.  
(ii) Some commentators argue that graduates pay for the public sector outlays for 
their education through the extra tax revenue provided from the higher income tax 
paid by this group. What is an appropriate conceptual framework in which to 
understand the correct level of taxpayers’ subsidies for higher education in this 
context? Suggested method: a modelling of the returns to both graduates and 
society (through taxation) of higher education investments.  
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(iii) Competing, perhaps extreme, interpretations of the relationship between earnings 
and higher education are: one, that the process simply identifies those with high 
ability and motivation (‘screening’); and two, that higher education endows 
individuals with greater skills and thus higher incomes (human capital theory). 
What do these different perspectives imply for the extent to which taxpayers 
should subsidise the process? Suggested method: an examination of the literature 
with respect to the conceptual basis and empirical evidence concerning screening 
versus human capital literature, and an exploration of what the results imply for 
the role of externalities.  
(iv) A conventional argument for government intervention in the process of higher 
education investment is that there is a ‘capital market failure’ — banks are alleged 
to be unprepared to provide loans to prospective students because there is a high 
risk of default and no collateral insurance for the lender. What is the empirical 
basis of this claim, and how important is the issue in an overall assessment of the 
supposed role for government intervention?  Why should the argument be based 
on the unwillingness of banks to lend excluding the possible willingness of 
capitalists to invest?  Suggested method: an examination of the conceptual basis 
for capital market failure and an investigation of evidence concerning the 
supposed reluctance of banks to provide unsecured finance (a survey and analysis 
of banks might be a useful research exercise in this context) and the supposed 
asymmetry of information between students and lenders (do students really have a 
better idea about their future earnings than lenders?).  
(v) Case studies in political economy. What are the important factors behind a 
government’s willingness and capacity to implement higher education financing 
reform? Suggested method: an examination of the importance of the institutional 
and political constraints concerning the adoption of ICL (see Johnstone and 
Aemero, 2001 and Ziderman and Albrecht, 1995).  
(vi) In policy design terms it is useful to develop a conceptual framework which 
allows the costs and benefits for the public sector of alternative approaches to be 
analysed. What issues should such a framework take into consideration, and what 
form should it take? Suggested method: the documentation and justification of 
alternative government utility functions, paying attention to the rationales behind 
the weights and forms of their nature in the context of public choice and other 
theoretical frameworks.  
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(vii) Comparisons of the relative costs and benefits of alternative approaches for 
government intervention with respect to higher education financing need to 
address the consequences of policy design for student behavioral responses; this 
should canvass, among other issues, adverse selection and moral hazard. What 
light can economic theory cast on these issues generally, and how should this best 
be addressed with the use of a conceptual framework? Suggested method: the 
development of a model allowing analysis of student choices of the effects of 
different policies on graduate outcomes, taking into consideration different 
dimensions of risk and uncertainty (perhaps following, or comparing and 
contrasting, the approaches outlined in Nerlove, 1975, Chia, 1990, Grout, 1983 
and Quiggin, 2003). 
(viii) The nature and form of government approaches to higher education financing will 
likely have important consequences for the access of those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. What is the empirical evidence concerning the participation of the 
disadvantaged in higher education with respect to different government 
approaches concerning conventional financing schemes? Suggested method: an 
examination of panel data in particular countries with respect to the 
socioeconomic characteristics of disadvantaged individuals participating in higher 
education, specifically given the occurrence of a ‘natural experiment’ involving 
policy changes (such as adopted by Chapman and Ryan, 2002). 
(ix) Comparisons of the relative costs and benefits of alternative approaches for 
government intervention with respect to higher education financing need to 
address the consequences of policy design for student behavioral responses; this 
should canvass, among other issues, adverse selection and moral hazard. What 
light can economic theory cast on these issues generally, and how should this best 
be addressed with the use of a conceptual framework? Suggested method: the 
development of a model allowing analysis of student choices of the effects of 
different policies on graduate outcomes, taking into consideration different 
dimensions of risk and uncertainty (perhaps following, or comparing and 
contrasting, the approaches outlined in Nerlove (1975), Chia (1990), Grout (1983) 
and Quiggin (2003)). 
(x) The reluctance of the private sector to be involved in the financing of education.  
What are the circumstances under which private investments exist for education?  
 74
Suggested method: find a place where there is active participation of private 
financing of education and analyse the circumstances under which it developed. 
(xi) Hanushek, Leung and Yilmaz (2004) develop a general equilibrium model to 
analyse the effects of different college aid approaches on economic efficiency, 
intergenerational mobility and income inequality. However, their modelling of 
ICL is restricted to risk-pooling schemes, and the only type of uncertainty allowed 
relates to the probability of a student completing college. What outcomes would 
result with extensions of their approach to cover risk-sharing ICL, and with 
additional types of uncertainty, such as with respect to future graduate incomes? 
(xii) It is likely that different types of loan schemes affect graduate career outcomes as 
a result of the different consequences of repayment obligations. What are the 
conceptual issues, and how can they best be modelled, pertinent to an 
understanding of job choices given expected variations in future consumption 
patterns as a result of the timing and nature of student debt repayment? Suggested 
method: the specification and analysis of different utility functions conditional on 
both levels and variances of future consumption patterns influenced by alternate 
paths of loan repayment obligations (see Browning and Crossley, 2001). 
(xiii) Documentation and analysis of the recent experience of countries implementing, 
or attempting to implement, ICL (this could be done with respect to a host of 
economic and policy issues, such as administration, revenue and access). What 
have been the effects of ICL of different forms? Suggested method: an 
exploration in detail of the design and (actual and likely) effects of a particular 
country’s ICL policy, perhaps in a comparative context, with the use and 
improvement of the approaches taken with respect to the best documented 
example, Australia. There are by now many candidates warranting further 
research, including New Zealand, Chile, South Africa and the UK. 
(xiv) An exploration of the administrative and political economy factors behind the 
unsuccessful implementation of ICLs in the US. Why is it that ICL policies are 
seemingly a successful alternative to traditional policy approaches to higher 
education financing in Australia, New Zealand and the UK, but have not evolved 
in the similar institutional environment of the US? Suggested method: an 
examination and documentation of both the influence and nature of US vested 
interests (specifically the commercial beneficiaries of student loan arrangements), 
and the design weaknesses of the US ICL approach. If there was to be an 
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informed political economy analysis of the lack of success of the US scheme, it 
start with the role of commercial vested interests in opposing reform of this type, 
as implied in Schrag (2001). 
(xv) The lessons for research of the Australian experience with respect to the effects of 
ICL. What has been the experience of other countries’ income contingent higher 
education financing approaches with respect to the major economic variables? 
Suggested method: a replication of the Australian research in countries 
experiencing changes to financing policy, including documentation of the 
consequences for internal rates of return and enrolments, revenue, and access (see 
Chapman and Ryan, 2002).  
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